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ABSTRACT 
ENVIRONMENT, DECISION MAKING AND CONSENSUS 
IN THE STRATEGIC PROCESS: 
AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF SEVENTEEN ORGANIZATIONS 
SEPTEMBER, 1989 
MARY T. ROGERS, B.A., COLLEGE OF OUR LADY OF THE ELMS 
M.B.A., WESTERN NEW ENGLAND COLLEGE 
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
Directed by: William R. Wooldridge 
This study explored relationships surrounding 
consensus on strategic priorities among top and middle 
managers. It examined relationships among involvement, 
commitment, and agreement on strategic priorities under 
conditions of environmental dynamism and complexity. The 
stage of the firm's strategic process was also 
considered. 
Ten banks and seven mature manufacturing firms were 
studied. Each CEO was interviewed on his firm's 
strategic priorities and strategic processes. Top and 
middle managers from each firm were surveyed to obtain 
measures of perceived environmental dynamism and 
complexity, perceived level of involvement in the 
strategic process, commitment to strategic priorities, 
and understanding of strategic priorities. 
The results suggested that perceived involvement in 
the strategic process and agreement with the CEO on 
viii 
strategic priorities were greater at top management 
levels. However, commitment to strategic priorities was 
not significantly different between the top and middle 
management levels. When top management perceived the 
environment to be dynamic, there were increased levels 
of involvement in the organization. When middle 
management perceived the environment as complex, their 
commitment to strategic priorities will be greater with 
higher levels of perceived involvement in the strategic 
process. Perceived involvement was not related to shared 
understanding, nor was strategic process stage related 
to agreement with the CEO on strategic priorities. 
Contrary to the thrust of the consensus literature, 
low levels of agreement rather than high levels of 
agreement appear to be more normal during the strategic 
process and could be an important factor for building in 
flexibility for organizations in dynamic environments. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
This study examined consensus on strategic 
assumptions among top and middle level managers in 17 
organizations. Specifically, it explored factors that 
affect the dimensions of consensus and the interaction 
of these dimensions. The focus was primarily on the role 
consensus played in the strategic decision process. 
Background 
The traditional, literature in strategic management 
depicted the strategic process as directive, 
comprehensive and primarily the concern of top 
management (Andrews, 1971; Schendel & Hofer, 1979; 
Steiner, Miner & Gray, 1982). As Fredrickson (1983) and 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) pointed out the traditional 
(or synoptic) model assumed a rational approach to 
decision making and was characterized by two separate 
process stages. Strategic formulation involved 
comprehensive analysis to identify strategic goals and 
methods. The second process stage, implementation, was 
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characterized as involving a variety of administrative 
tactics that differ according to who was involved in the 
process and the nature of the involvement (Nutt, 1987). 
Based on this traditional model, much of the early 
research on the strategic process examined the 
performance effects of ''formal” versus "informal” 
planning (Fulmer and Rue, 1974; Grinyer and Norburn, 
1975; Herold, 1972; Karger and Malik, 1975; Kudla, 1980; 
Leontiades and Tezel, 1980; Scheehan, 1975; Thune and 
House, 1970; Wood and LaForge, 1979). This stream of 
research showed no conclusive evidence that a particular 
style of planning was more beneficial to performance 
than another. The strategic process was effectively a 
"black box” with no true indication of the process 
within. 
Another group of scholars (e.g. Quinn (1980), 
Mintzberg (1978), Braybrooke and Lindblom (1970), 
Steinbruner (1974), and Wrapp (1967)), however, have 
observed a much less structured process. In general, 
these writers have described the strategy process as 
evolutionary rather than deliberate and sequential. 
Strategy formation occurred in increments across a 
series of molecular decisions based on comparing 
alternative actions to the current situation and 
situational constraints. Actions were chosen that fit 
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these constraints and could be rationalized to fit the 
current concept of strategy within the organization. 
Viewing strategy in this way, Mintzberg (1978) described 
strategy as a "pattern in a stream” of strategic 
actions. 
These two descriptions need not be considered 
contradictory but merely alternative perspectives 
regarding how long range decisions are made and 
combined. In reality most organizations mixed modes of 
strategy making (Fredrickson, 1983; and Mintzberg, 
1973). Further, the mix varied depending on the stage 
of the decision-making process (Nutt, 1977) and the 
nature of the decision and the organizational department 
involved (Mintzberg, 1973). 
The traditional view of the strategic process 
continued to emphasize goals, plans and resource 
allocations by its continuing emphasis on the designing 
of a "grand plan". Fredrickson (1981), however, has 
called for a decision based perspective. Upon reviewing 
the principal characteristics of the traditional, 
synoptic model, Fredrickson (1983) found that the model 
is not realistic as it pertains to the current needs and 
patterns now existing in organizations. All 
organizations do not plan formally but all make 
strategic decisions. 
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Thus, Fredrickson (1983) argued for a decision 
based perspective that would allow strategic research to 
continue in firms attempting to use a synoptic process 
for decision making but more importantly would allow 
more thorough and comparative research in firms not 
employing formal planning methods. Under a decision 
based perspective, researchers study the process of 
making individual strategic decisions. The focus was not 
on the planning process. Since all firms make strategic 
decisions (Fredrickson, 1984) and a firm's pattern of 
behavior across decisions (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 
1984) was consistent, a decision based perspective 
allows for potential strategic research across virtually 
all firms. 
Fredrickson (1983) also suggested that researchers 
emphasize the development of concepts, constructs and 
measures. Since the concepts that are of particular 
importance to strategic process research are likely to 
be "intangible", they are likely to be difficult to 
objectively measure. Thus, Fredrickson argued that 
research use both quantitative and qualitative methods. 
The study described here took a decision based 
perspective, and used a variety of methods to examine 
the dimensions of consensus and their relationship to 
decision making in the strategic process. Measures for 
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the dimensions of consensus covered in the study evolved 
from previous research in a variety of areas. Given the 
conflicting results of prior studies, the assumption 
that consensus is "good" for strategy was not made and, 
therefore, there was no emphasis on performance at this 
point in time. Rather, the emphasis was in trying to 
develop appropriate measures of the consensus 
constructs. Additionally, the study attempted to 
determine some of the important factors that affect 
consensus. It would then be hoped that factors shown to 
affect consensus could be used to predict or influence 
the direction of the strategic decision within 
particular settings. 
Previous Consensus Research 
Questions Addressed 
Since strategy is the culmination of individual 
decisions, consensus building can be seen as an 
important part of the strategic process. Research on 
consensus-building has been important for a long time. 
As early as 1969, Stagner investigated consensus in 
organizations. Previous consensus research as reviewed 
by Dess and Origer (1987) primarily dealt with consensus 
in parts of the strategic process itself such as 
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consensus on dimensions in the decision making process: 
cohesiveness, formality and centralization (Stagner, 
1969) and consensus on the degree of perceived formality 
of the planning systems (Grinyer and Norburn, 1975). 
This study considered another dimension of the strategic 
decision making process, the weighting of strategic 
priorities for the evaluation of alternatives in 
decision making. Consistent with suggestions that 
environmental dynamism and complexity affect consensus 
(Bourgeois, 1983, 1985; Hrebiniak and Snow, 1982; Dess, 
1987), this study examined relationships between 
dynamism, complexity and consensus. 
Measures Used 
Both "agreement'' and "disagreement" have been used 
as measures in consensus research. The dependent 
measures have not been consistent but can generally be 
categorized as based on an objective "performance" 
measure (Stagner, 1969; Grinyer and Norburn, 1975; 
DeWoot, Haevert and Martou, 1977-78; Bourgeois 1980, 
1985; Bourgeois and Singh, 1983; Hrebiniak and Snow, 
1982; Dess, 1987). A few have dealt with both dimensions 
of consensus: understanding of that which is agreed upon 
and attitude toward the agreement (Whitney and Smith, 
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1983; Tjosvold and Field, 1983). In this study 
the degree of consensus (level of agreement and 
commitment) and the scope of consensus (who participates 
in the agreement) was measured. Performance was not 
used as a dependent variable because as previously 
mentioned it was not assumed that consensus was "good" 
in all stages and for all types of strategy. 
Conflicting Findings 
It would seem that some form of consensus or 
agreement on purpose or objective would be necessary if 
the .firm is to achieve its goals. Grinyer and Norburn 
(1975) and DeWoot, Heyvaert and Martou (1977-78) have 
investigated links between consensus and organizational 
effectiveness. Still others have discussed outright the 
importance of consensus in strategic decision making 
(Barnard, 1938; Hrebiniak & Joyce, 1984; Steiner, 1979; 
Tilles, 1963). However, actual research findings on 
consensus were conflicting. DeWoot et al. (1977-78) 
found that disagreement on means was found in firms with 
long-term profitability. Bourgeois (1980) found that 
consensus on objectives and methods was positively 
related to firm performance. In contrast. Bourgeois 
(1985) found consensus on goals was not related to firm 
performance. Since most of the consensus research is 
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similar to the "black box" approach of traditional 
strategic process research (Fredrickson, 1983), it is 
not surprising that here too conflicting findings were 
found. Research dealing with the decision making process 
as it relates to strategic process has been sparse. 
Possible Explanations 
Dess (1987) suggested that future consensus 
research find the limits of the negative and positive 
relationship of consensus. In an attempt to explain 
these findings, Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) provided a 
description of how the strategic process affects 
consensus. In addition to the degree of consensus among 
the top management (TM) covered in the Dess and Origer 
(1987) review of previous consensus literature 
(Bourgeois, 1980, 1985; Bourgeois & Singh, 1983; Dess, 
1987; Grinyer & Norburn, 1975), Wooldridge and Floyd 
(1989) propose that content and scope of consensus were 
relevant in a strategic context. 
Consensus: Degree 
Consensus research has focused primarily on 
understanding of strategy even though commitment to the 
9 
strategy is an important dimension in the degree of 
consensus (Dess, 1987). A high degree of consensus is 
achieved when both commitment and understanding are high 
(Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). Other combinations of 
these dimensions can and do occur and may be important 
in the dynamics of achieving high firm performance. 
Finally, Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) suggested that the 
content of the consensus goes beyond shared 
understandings about ends and means and includes 
commitment to strategy. Guth and MacMillan (1986) noted 
that understanding without commitment can result in 
"counter effort". 
Consensus: Content 
Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) suggest that the 
content of consensus (referring to what decision makers 
agree on) may be different at different stages of the 
rational-comprehensive strategic process and may differ 
for other process types such as Quinn's incrementalism. 
Focus on ends and means of previous studies seemed 
relevant to later stages of the rational comprehensive 
process. Exploration was needed to discover the 
importance which content of consensus in earlier stages 
of the rational process and under other types of 
processes. 
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Consensus: Scope 
The scope of consensus (who participates) may 
include more than top management. Fredrickson (1984, p. 
459) emphasized "that participation in the strategic 
process is not limited to a few individuals who are 
located at the very top of the organization." The 
literature covering alternative decision processes (Deal 
& Kennedy, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; Quinn, 1980; Frederickson, 
1986) suggested that the scope of consensus on strategy 
was important beyond the top management. Mintzberg 
(1973, 1978) has shown that strategic participation 
beyond the top management was important in complex and 
uncertain environments. 
Consensus: Strategic Process Stage 
Finally, Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) suggested that 
both understanding and commitment were likely to be low 
in the initial stages of the strategic process and 
increase as the opportunities to improve understanding 
and commitment occurred. As suggested earlier, assuming 
a rational process model, consensus on environment, 
goals and means was only appropriate at later stages of 
the process. Early consensus may be lead to premature 
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closure and have dysfunctional consequences (Bourgeois, 
1985; Janis, 1972; Allison, 1971; Loasby, 1967). 
In an incremental context, initial consensus may be 
built up outside top management. Eventually, top 
management would have to ratify and agree to the 
strategic initiative but commitment would still be low 
because of the existence of competitive strategic 
initiatives. As a common ground among these strategic 
initiatives appeared, consensus was likely to increase 
towards the priorities implicit in the realized 
strategies. 
Environment 
Several authors have suggested that environment was 
a critical contingency affecting decision making 
(Thompson, 1967; Aldrich, 1979; Nutt, 1976). 
Environment affected the difference between the 
information available for decision making. Stability was 
the environmental dimension which has been most often 
found to affect decision making (Duncan, 1972). 
Stability increased the likelihood of gaining knowledge 
about critical variables. In an unstable environment not 
only were the critical decision variables not readily 
apparent but the cause and effect relationships were 
difficult to understand (Fredrickson and Mitchell, 
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1984). It has been suggested (Anderson and Paine, 1975; 
Hatten and Schendel, 1976; Mintzberg, 1973; Nutt, 1976) 
that under certainty, the traditional, synoptic decision 
model is more appropriate. Under uncertainty the 
incremental model may be more appropriate (Mintzberg, 
1973; Nutt, 1976). 
Summary 
In summary, possible explanations for conflicting 
findings in consensus research could have been due in 
part to lack of consideration of the degree of 
consensus, scope of consensus, and the process stage of 
consensus. Further, environment may have been a 
critical contingency factor in the importance of these 
additional considerations of consensus. 
Problem Statement 
This study used both quantitative and qualitative 
methods to examine consensus in seventeen organizations. 
The primary objective was to answer the following 
questions: 
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-does involvement in the strategic process increase 
commitment and understanding (consensus) of strategic 
priorities? 
-does the business environment as perceived by top 
management have an effect on who participates in the 
strategic process? 
-how does the stage of the strategic process affect 
understanding and commitment of strategic priorities? 
Design of the Study 
The population from which the sample was drawn 
consisted of small and medium size savings banks and 
small and medium size manufacturing firms. The savings 
banks were a mix of mutual savings banks and publicly 
held savings banks. The mix of the manufacturing firms 
included both private and publicly held firms. The 
manufacturing firms were taken from mature industries. 
The selection of firms from mature manufacturing 
industries and the dynamic banking industry was done in 
order to sample a broad range of environmental settings. 
Data on consensus in the strategic process was 
gathered through the use of a survey distributed to all 
management staff including the president. The survey 
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was coded by level of management and organization. The 
survey was developed through a deductive process by 
reviewing prior, related research and constructing a 
six-part survey instrument. A panel of three academic 
researchers and three business executives reviewed and 
critiqued the closed-answer questions and suggested 
critical modifications regarding wording of 
instructions, wording of questions, format and 
appearance of the survey. The final revised survey was 
distributed to top and middle management levels in 10 
banks and 7 manufacturing firms. 
Before distributing the survey in an organization 
an interview with the president or one of the chief 
executives of the organization was conducted. Open 
ended questions concerning the business environment, 
strategic priorities and strategic process of the 
organization were asked. This coupling of both 
qualitative information from CEOs and quantitative 
information from multiple respondents within a firm 
helped to enrich the data collected. 
Contributions of the Research 
The value of this study lay in its intent to 
provide quantitative as well as matching qualitative 
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documentation of the strategic process within both 
similar and contrasting organizations. Further, its 
value lay in the depth of research within each of the 
organizations of the study. There was currently 
relatively little documentation or theoretical 
development of consensus in the strategic process at the 
time of the study. This study will help both scholars 
and practitioners to understand better the effect of 
strategic management processes in the organization. 
Scholars will have documented evidence of the effect of 
involvement in the strategic processes on commitment and 
understanding of strategic priorities; practitioners 
will have information on how these processes are 
developed to fit particular settings. 
Limitations of the. Research 
Executive interviews were subject to the biases of 
the interviewer. The survey instrument and its 
distribution could not isolate and control for all 
causal factors. Therefore, the results could be due to 
a number of factors such as self-selection at the 
organization level and self-selection within the 
organization, the biases of the interviewer, the 
communication skills of the executive or a number of 
other confounding influences. However, by combining an 
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depth survey of each organization with an in depth 
interview with each organization president the impact of 
these influences has likely been reduced. 
Though sampling techniques have not been 
randomized, all historically mutual-type savings banks 
within a certain size range and a certain geographic 
location were asked to participate in the study. All 
manufacturing firms within a certain size and within 
certain industries as well as within the same geographic 
location as the banks were asked to participate in the 
study. Further, all top and middle managers within each 
of the organizations studied were surveyed. 
The intention of this study was to run a 
preliminary test of propositions for exploring the 
strategic process. However, no simple causal statements 
concerning these propositions can be made without 
replication of this study in other settings and without 
conducting other confirmatory research in other 
geographical areas, and other industries as well as 
other types of banks. 
Overview of Subsequent Chapters 
The rest of this document is divided into five 
sections. Chapter II discusses the pertinent theory and 
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literature on consensus and consensus building processes 
and develops the particular hypotheses being explored. 
Chapter III discusses the relevant research methodology 
used in this study. Chapter IV presents the results of 
the data analysis and provides a discussion of those 
results. It also includes interpretation of the 
executive interviews based on the hypothesis studied. 
Chapter V contains a summary and conclusions of the 
study. Finally, the bibliography and appendices related 
to the study are included. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to review the 
relevant literature. First, the key factors in the 
industrial environments are discussed. Second, current 
descriptive and normative literature on approaches to 
the strategic process are reviewed. Third, the 
literature on strategic consensus is considered. 
Finally, hypotheses concerning these concepts are 
developed and proposed. 
An early definition of strategy (Von Neumann and 
Morgensterm, 1947) portrayed strategy as a series of 
actions by a firm that were guided by the situations the 
firm found itself in. In this definition, actions were 
the key to strategy. Later Chandler (1962) added the 
concept of formulating long range goals and objectives 
to guide strategic actions. Strategy formulation became 
formula based and attempts were made to accomplish 
strategic formulation outside the line management of the 
organization. The need for a bridge between the 
strategic idea and strategic realization became apparent 
and the concept of strategic implementation developed. 
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As the literature progressed, strategy formulation 
and strategy implementation were conceptualized as 
separate and distinct functions. The assumption was 
that an objective environment existed. Enough 
information could be found. Strategy was considered a 
sequential process where goals (ends) were first fully 
developed and then the means for attaining them 
established. Implementation was generally thought to 
take place through organizational structures, control 
systems, and corporate edicts. Given these assumptions 
the term rational was associated with the strategic 
process. Further, the process was considered 
comprehensive. It was assumed that important aspects of 
the environment could be nearly completely known and 
that the formulation and implementation design could be 
completely or nearly completely determined before 
beginning implementation. 
In summary, the traditional rational-comprehensive 
strategic literature depicted a process where strategy 
was developed by planning specialists located at the top 
of the organization and implemented by the issuing of 
corporate edicts (Andrews, 1971; Schendel & Hofer, 1979; 
Steiner, Miner & Gray, 1982). This model portrayed the 
process as predominantly directive and not involving a 
great deal of middle management participation. 
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Mintzberg (1978), Quinn (1980), and others observed 
that regardless of the preciseness of the developed 
strategic design, organizations were unlikely to fully 
achieve their intended strategy. In many organizations, 
strategy formulation did not exist apart from 
implementation. Rather, realized strategies evolved 
from a combination of intended and emergent influences 
that guide numerous decisions made over time. This view 
implied that the strategic process may involve not only 
top management decisions but decisions of managers at 
various organizational levels. Decisions were blended 
and smoothed as part of the strategic process and the 
pattern that emerged became the organization's realized 
strategy. 
In summary, this model depicted strategy as 
evolving over time with the process occurring at various 
levels of management. 
Over time these descriptions began to be viewed as 
theoretical ends of a continuum. That is, the processes 
used in real world organizations seemed to have elements 
of both the rational and incremental models. However, 
very little research had been done at the time of this 
study that investigated how the two descriptions 
actually combine. Mintzberg and Waters (1985) suggested 
that organizations mix these pure forms producing 
relatively unique processes. Both Fredrickson (1983) 
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and Mintzberg (1973) noted this blending or mixing. 
Fredrickson (1983) holds that a blending of those two 
models may be found even within a single decision. 
Because of this belief, Fredrickson (1983) argued for a 
decision based perspective for strategic research. 
Others have suggested that consensus in strategic 
decision making (Hrebiniak and Joyce, 1984; Nielsen, 
1981; Steiner, 1979) was an important concept for this 
area of research. Consensus building provided an 
important aspect to combining individual strategic 
decisions to form organizational strategy. 
Thus, this study used a decision based perspective 
as emphasized by Fredrickson (1983). In particular it 
investigated the linkages between several dimensions of 
consensus and the strategic decision making process. 
Environment 
The environment has been considered an important 
contingency in strategy research (Hofer, 1975; Aguilar, 
1967; Porter, 1980; and Huff, 1982). Dess and Origer 
(1987) developed a theoretical framework of consensus 
(see figure 1) in strategy formulation, and emphasized 
the importance of industry environments in influencing 
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Figure 1. Consensus in strategy formulation (Dess and 
Origer, 1987, p.324). 
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the strategic alignment options available to the 
organization. 
Environmental Dimensions 
Dess and Beard (1984) identified three 
environmental dimensions that affect an organization's 
task environment; dynamism, complexity, and munificence. 
Dynamism was defined as the degree of stability in the 
environment. The degree of stability affected the 
likelihood of identifying critical information for a 
task. Complexity was related to the heterogeneity of 
the organization's activities. With greater 
heterogeneity the manager faced a more complex 
information need with information coming from many 
different sources concerning many different areas. 
Together, dynamism and complexity resulted in 
environmental uncertainty. Uncertainty has been defined 
as the difference between the information needed to 
perform a task and the information available (Galbraith, 
1973). Dynamism directly affects uncertainty. Under a 
stable environment the likelihood of identifying the 
critical information is increased. Therefore, 
uncertainty is likely to decrease. Complexity increases 
uncertainty by increasing the number of factors likely 
to be critical for performing the task. 
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The third factor, munificence, is defined as the 
extent to which the environment can sustain growth. 
Growth stability may allow the organization to generate 
slack resources which can provide a buffer during 
relative scarcity. It does not affect the information 
needed for a task but it affects the relative outcome of 
decisions based on the information used for the task. 
Poor decisions may have a less dramatic effect on the 
business if slack resources are available. 
Under slack conditions more options can be 
considered and used. Bourgeois and Singh (1983) found 
that slack provides the necessary resources for policy 
conflicts to occur and for coalitions to form. Slack 
could explain the difference in findings between DeWoot, 
Heyvaert, & Martou (1977-78) and Dess (1987). More 
efficient groups were characterized by frequent 
disagreement on means (DeWoot et al., 1977-78) but 
agreement on strategic methods was positively related to 
firm performance (Dess, 1987). Dess's findings were 
based solely on privately held organizations. 
Generally, privately held organizations have little 
financial slack due to limited financial resources. 
Therefore, this low slack demanded consensus on methods 
to conserve resources. Reinforcing this, Lawrence and 
Lorsch (1967) found that high differentiation required 
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high integration if it was to be effective. However, 
the high integration had a high cost factor which would 
not be available under low slack conditions. Therefore, 
availability of slack may have more effect on the 
outcome of strategy than it would on the building of 
consensus. 
Perception of the Environment 
Managers "enact" (Weick, 1969) their environment by 
attending to different segments of the organization's 
environment, (Cyert & March, 1963). Because of this, 
objective measures of the environment must be 
distinguished from subjective measures, i.e. perceived 
by the members of the organization (Dess and Origer, 
1987). Perception of the organizational environment has 
been recognized as an important first step to the 
strategy making process (Aguilar, 1967; Anderson & 
Paine, 1975; Andrews, 1971; Bourgeois, 1980; Hambrick, 
1982; Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, & Rosenblum, 1977). 
Similarly perceived environments would seem to lead to 
coordinated strategies. However, if enough information 
concerning the strategic task were to be available then 
a number of individuals must be involved in the process. 
Since the executives were likely to represent various 
areas of the organization, they would bring with them a 
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vide variety of envirormental perceptions due to their 
differing functional tracks, career paths and foraal 
roles (Hambrick & Mason, 1984; Beyer, 1981; \stley, 
Axelsson, Butler, Hickson, & Wilson, 1982). Individual 
differences could also be attributed to individual 
repertoires and social expectations (Dovney & SIocub, 
1975). During the strategic process so*e of these 
differences would be negotiated in order to develop 
coKBon goals. Bourgeois (1985) found empirical evidence 
to support this expected variance in the executive's 
perceptions. He goes on to say that variance being 
necessary for effective performance of the organization, 
overall the subjectiv'e measures of the environment 
needed to be congruent with the objective environment. 
Evidence has been found (Tjosvold & Field, 1983) 
that although the same decision might be made, the 
general understanding and commitment to the decision 
differed under differing environmental subsystems. 
These environmental subsystems resembled the "local" 
perspectives of Astley et al. (1982) or the functional 
departmentalization found by Lawrence and Lorsch (1967) 
that created variance in perceived environment. 
Therefore, combining this evidence with the already 
determined importance of environmental uncertainty, 
perceived environmental uncertainty was included as a 
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key variable in this study. Munificence was not 
considered because of its primary effect on the outcome 
of the decision process rather than on the decision 
process itself. 
Strategic Process Effects on Consensus 
Importance of Involvement 
Barnard (1938) took note of the potential 
limitations on the accuracy of individual perception by 
placing importance on the process of cooperation. He 
noted that the individual "possesses a limited power of 
choice" in dealing with situations and "is limited by 
all the factors in the situation, especially an 
individual's own biological limitations." According to 
Barnard, cooperation was the most effective method for 
overcoming these limitations. Cooperation required the 
"adoption of a group, or non-personal, purpose" 
(Barnard, 1938, p.60). Barnard implied that the 
interaction for achieving this group purpose 
(coordination) involved changes in the "motives and 
interests of those participating in the 
cooperation" (p.60). Barnard further stated that 
cooperation would not survive if the process used for 
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achieving cooperation did not relate to the 
environmental situation. 
Later Argyris (1966) and Likert (1967) argued that 
participation in decision making was essential in 
obtaining employee commitment. Ouchi's (1981) Theory Z 
based on Japanese management techniques boosted the 
importance of participation in decision-making. From 
their research, Locke and Latham (1984) concluded that 
although participation in decision making may be 
important it was not a panacea. More research was 
needed to determine when participation would be most 
effective. 
Consensus: Scope 
The discussion of participation highlights an 
area of concern for consensus, scope, i.e., who 
participates in consensus (Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). 
Traditional strategic literature emphasized the 
importance of top management in the strategic process by 
emphasizing their role in strategy formulation. 
Mintzberg (1978) introduced the concept of middle 
management playing a role in the strategic process with 
the concept of "realized strategy". This concept 
emphasized that strategy was the pattern in a stream of 
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individual decisions that were made by both top and 
middle management. Though Mintzberg recognized the role 
of middle management in the strategic process, his 
separation of intended and emergent influences suggested 
a stronger role in the process for top management. 
While previous consensus research has focused on 
top management (Dess & Origer, 1987), Fredrickson (1984) 
has emphasized that participation in the strategic 
process is not limited merely to top management. Nutt's 
(1987) research suggested the possibility of a wide 
range of involvement of middle management in the 
strategic process. Further, broad participation could be 
expected to lead to higher performance in complex and 
uncertain environments (Mintzberg, 1973, 1978). 
Therefore, "consensus scope may be more closely related 
to performance than consensus degree." (Wooldridge and 
Floyd, 1989: p. 299) 
Consensus among initiating coalitions may have been 
more important than consensus in the top management team 
when the strategic process emphasized such coalitions 
(Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989). However, middle management 
may have difficulty in perceiving the effect their 
decisions may have on realized strategy (Litterer, 
Miyamoto, Verge, & Voyer, 1985). Though the middle 
managers may actually have had a strong effect on 
strategy their perception of the situation was very 
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narrow. Middle management makes decisions that 
corrected specific situational problems, that satisfy 
political factors and that can be rationalized to fit 
corporate strategy (Narayanan and Fahey, 1982; 
Burgelman, 1983). Middle management would, therefore, 
perceive less involvement in the strategic process than 
top management. 
Bringing together the effect involvement has on 
strategy and the effect that hierarchical level has on 
the perception of that involvement, the following 
hypothesis is put forth: 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived involvement in the strategic 
process will be greater at higher levels of management. 
Top management will perceive higher levels of 
involvement in the strategic process. Middle management 
will perceive lower levels of involvement in the 
strategic process. 
Fit Between Task Environment and Involvement 
Of special concern was the work done by Vroom and 
Yetton (1973; 1975) on the situational contingencies 
important to fitting decision making styles to the task 
environment. The patterns of decision styles they 
explored paralleled closely the implementation tactics 
observed by Nutt (1986, 1987). The situational 
variables Vroom and Yetton considered were the quality 
of the decision needed, the kind and amount of 
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information needed, the problem structure and 
acceptance/commitment to the decision needed. Vroom 
(1975) found that most managers used all methods under 
some circumstances. Vroom's model suggested that there 
are specific problem situations that call for certain 
decision styles. Vroom's (1975) findings strongly 
suggest that the decisions made by typical managers were 
more likely to be ineffective due to being unacceptable 
to subordinates than due to poor decision quality. The 
managers neglected to follow the rules necessary for 
obtaining subordinates' commitment. In order to obtain 
commitment, the Vroom model prescribed more 
participative approaches when the decision was not 
likely to be accepted if it was made by the manager 
alone. The model did not suggest the situational 
factors that would allow the determination of whether or 
not the decisions would be accepted by subordinates. 
Brodwin and Bourgeois (1984) discussed five 
patterns of strategic formulation and implementation 
that existed within organizations. These were the 
Commander, Organizational Change, Collaborative, 
Cultural and Crescive approaches. Each of these 
approaches used different types of participation in the 
strategic process. At one end of the spectrum of 
patterns was Commander which was strictly top-down 
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management. At the other end of the spectrum of 
patterns was Crescive approach which was primarily a 
bottom-up approach to management. 
Brodwin and Bourgeois' (1984) suggested that 
various strategic management processes may be more 
effective under differing industrial environments. 
Directive approaches attempted to reduce uncertainty 
through environmental analysis and selection of 
appropriate strategic action. This action was planned 
for in detail and then carried out by edict. 
Under a dynamic environment, changes in the 
environment were frequent and occurred over many aspects 
of the environment. This requires many alternate 
"views" of the environment in order to broaden the 
perspectives of the decision makers. Though trying to 
reach agreement was helpful to decision makers under a 
dynamic environment, agreement was harder to achieve 
because each participant would have different 
information concerning the situation. Bourgeois' (1985) 
research suggested that although reduction of 
uncertainty may be appropriate under stable 
environmental conditions, it could be dysfunctional 
under volatile environments: 
Uncertainty should not be reduced if it is, in 
fact, an accurate manifestation of the objective 
situation. In fact, uncertainty may be functional 
in volatile environments, at least when it is 
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experienced at the strategy-making level of the 
organization. (Bourgeois, 1985: p.570) 
Brodwin and Bourgeois (1984) have addressed the 
appropriateness of these five patterns to the industrial 
environment and drew the conclusion from their research 
that the Commander, Organizational Change, and the 
Collaborative Approaches which were more directive were 
most effective for smaller industrial firms. The 
Cultural and Crescive techniques which were more 
participative were important for complex organizations. 
For the small and the complex organization, the 
environment was still an important factor. 
Under a nearly stable environment the structure of 
problems is very well-defined. If top management 
perceives high stability in the environment, they will 
assume changes occur infrequently and that analysis of 
the environment is possible and the problem can be well- 
defined. Therefore, directive approaches may be used to 
reduce uncertainty in the organizational setting. Such 
techniques are based on extensive independent analysis; 
quality, comprehensive decisions can be made using 
fairly complete information. 
Under dynamism the manager faces a task environment 
in which the likelihood of identifying critical 
information for a decision is low and there is a greater 
need for more complex information. Alternate views of 
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the environment can broaden the perspective of 
individual decision makers and improve the quality of 
the information considered. Participation in the 
strategic process increases the number of alternate 
views of the environment individual decision makers are 
exposed to. If top management perceives high 
environmental dynamism, the information needed for 
making strategic decisions will not be readily 
available. In seeking out more relevant and timely 
information, top management will seek participation from 
other parts of the organization in order to make 
knowledgeable, higher quality decisions. 
In summary, top management in attempting to make 
decisions with appropriate information will select 
decision making techniques that most match their 
information needs created by their perception of 
dynamism in the environment. Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is put forth: 
Hypothesis 2: Involvement in the strategic process will 
be greater for organizations whose top management 
perceives the environment to be relatively dynamic. 
Involvement in the strategic process will be less for 
organizations whose top management perceives the 
environment to be relatively stable. 
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Consensus: Content 
The importance of consensus in the strategic 
process has been stressed by Hrebiniak and Joyce (1984), 
Nielsen (1981), and Steiner (1979). However, previous 
studies have resulted in conflicting findings on the 
importance of this variable. 
Research concerned with consensus as an outcome has 
generally defined consensus as agreement. However, the 
subject matter of agreements varied widely. The 
subjects of agreement according to Dess and Origer 
(1987, p. 317) included 
satisfaction with decision making 
(Stagner, 1969), objectives and role 
perception (Grinyer & Norburn, 1977-78), 
means for accomplishing innovation activities 
(DeWoot, Heyvaert, & Martou, 1977-78), goals 
and means (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess, in press), 
firm strengths and weaknesses (Hrebiniak & 
Snow, 1982), and perceived environmental 
uncertainty (Bourgeois, 1985). 
The importance of finding appropriate areas of 
agreement for the strategic process followed from the 
fact that common understanding allowed for coordinating 
individual decisions and making individual decisions 
consistent across decision makers. Decision makers must 
come to see the organization in a consistent manner. 
Top management must develop a shared understanding of 
the organizational priorities. This leads to coherent 
emerging organizational strategy which further increases 
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the level of shared understanding among top management 
for a given strategy. A high level of consensus and 
shared understanding of a given strategy facilitates 
implementation of the strategy (Hall, 1982). 
Perhaps some of the differences in the findings of 
the consensus research can be attributed to different 
approaches to strategic processes. Some organizations 
selecting a very rational deductive process for strategy 
formulation may have used very specific formulated ends 
and means. Others may have used an informal process and 
may have depended on a general understanding of what the 
organization values. But to achieve cooperation 
especially where there are conflicts, Dess and Origer 
(1987) argued for the use of "superordinate goals". 
Sherif (1966) emphasized the "realization of a common 
lot". The use of priorities as a content area of 
organizational consensus would allow for the measurement 
of consensus in various settings covering both 
"superordinate goals" or simply the "common lot". 
Organizational priorities were distinct from 
organizational goals. Priorities did not depend on 
formulated ends and means but could be derived from ends 
and means. They were observable from decisions made 
{Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) and, therefore, they were 
translated throughout the organization. Priorities 
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being more generic would be less biased toward various 
strategic processes. Priorities could range from 
explicit goals to mere organizational momentum 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1985); from a formal statement of 
philosophy (Thompson & Strickland, 1986) to a vague 
understanding of organizational history (Peters & 
Waterman, 1982); or from an awareness of some acute need 
(Porter, 1980). 
Priorities were important points that were 
considered by the decision maker to weigh alternatives, 
to guide the direction of information searches, and to 
evaluate projected outcomes. The concept of managerial 
priorities has been discussed in the literature over a 
long period of time (Smith, Mitchell, and Summer, 1985). 
Representative of much of this literature was Deising's, 
(1962) typology of three types of priorities: (1) 
technical efficiency, (2) organizational integration, 
and (3) political support. The increasingly turbulent 
environment that firms found themselves in led to the 
consideration of other major types of priorities, such 
as product and process innovation. Additionally, market 
differentiation could be added (Porter, 1980) to take 
contemporary strategy content theory into account. 
Hambrick (1981) has labeled this degree of 
agreement "between an executive's perception and the 
chief executive's perception of the organization's 
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strategy as strategic awareness" {p.263) and found that 
strategic awareness was positively related to 
hierarchical level. In the Hambrick study strategy was 
represented by a one item measure developed from the 
Miles and Snow typology (i.e. Defender, Analyzer, 
Prospector). 
Perhaps some of the differences in the findings of 
the consensus research can be attributed to different 
approaches to strategic processes. Some organizations 
selecting a very rational deductive process for strategy 
formulation may have used very specific formulated ends 
and means. Others may have used an informal process and 
may have depended on a general understanding of what the 
organization values. But to achieve cooperation 
especially where there are conflicts. Dess and Origer 
(1987) argued for the use of "superordinate goals". 
Sherif (1966) emphasized the "realization of a common 
lot". 
The use of priorities as a content area of 
organizational consensus would allow for the measurement 
of consensus in various settings covering both 
"superordinate goals" or simply the "common lot". The 
concept of managerial priorities has been discussed in 
the literature over a long period of time (Smith, 
Mitchell, and Summer, 1985). Representative of much of 
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this literature was Deising's, (1962) typology of three 
types of priorities: (1) technical efficiency, (2) 
organizational integration, and (3) political support. 
The increasingly turbulent environment that firms found 
themselves in led to the consideration of other major 
types of priorities, such as product and process 
innovation. Additionally, market differentiation could 
be added (Porter, 1980) to take contemporary strategy 
content theory into account. 
Organizational priorities were distinct from 
organizational goals. Priorities implied rank ordering 
and did not depend on formulated ends and means but 
could be derived from ends and means. Priorities could 
be represented by explicit goals or mere organizational 
momentum (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985); by a formal 
statement of philosophy (Thompson & Strickland, 1986) or 
a vague understanding of organizational history (Peters 
& Waterman, 1982); or by an awareness of some acute need 
(Porter, 1980). Priorities were observable from 
decisions made (Wooldridge & Floyd, 1989) and, 
therefore, they were translated throughout the 
organization. Priorities were a way of ordering 
options. Priorities were important points that were 
considered by the decision maker to weigh alternatives, 
to guide the direction of information searches, and to 
evaluate projected outcomes. Priorities being more 
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generic would be less biased toward various strategic 
processes. 
Using the more complex approach of weighting and 
ranking priorities as another method of measuring 
strategic awareness and hypothesizing that this too 
would be affected by hierarchical level, the following 
hypothesis is made: 
Hypothesis 3: Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater at higher levels of 
management. Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater for top management and lower 
for middle management. 
Additionally, under the incremental model the CEO's 
perception of strategic priorities may not have been 
important to developing a common understanding of 
strategy. Coalition formation about a particular 
strategy may have required that the CEO not be involved 
in the setting of the priorities for the strategy. 
However, because of the nature of strategy the top 
management team would be heavily involved allowing for 
the airing of a variety of alternate views. This leads 
to a more complex and thorough understanding of the 
organization's strategic priorities. Rather than 
consider agreement with the CEO necessary, simply 
"shared understanding" of the priorities would be 
important to the strategic process. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis is put forth: 
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Hypothesis 4: Perceived individual involvement in the 
strategic process will be positively related to shared 
understanding. Higher levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to higher levels of shared 
understanding. Lower levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to lower levels of shared understanding. 
Consensus: Degree 
Consensus research had focused primarily on 
understanding of strategy even though commitment to the 
strategy was an important dimension in the degree of 
consensus (Dess, 1987). A high degree of consensus is 
achieved when both commitment and understanding are high 
(Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989). 
The acceptance of managerial decisions was 
important to the strategic process because of the extra 
effort needed to encourage cooperation to obtain 
behaviors such as helpfulness, suggestions and gestures 
of goodwill that provided flexibility to cope with 
unforeseen situations and enable individuals to deal 
with their interdependences. This kind of coordination 
required changes in the interests and motives of those 
participating in cooperation (Barnard, 1938). When a 
degree of effort was extended toward a goal, motives and 
interests were implied from that effort and commitment 
was said to occur (Reichers, 1985; Porter, Steers, 
Mowday, & Boulian, 1974) . 
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Wooldridge and Floyd (1989) proposed that 
consensus varies according to the type of strategic 
process used. The type of process used also had 
implications for the speed of the implementation. 
Hrebiniak and Snow (1982) found that commitment among 
managers had a positive influence on implementation of 
strategy. Acceptance and commitment to decisions was 
higher under early agreement than disagreement 
(Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986; Tjosvold & Field, 
1983) . Decisions were implemented more rapidly under a 
cooperative climate with mandatory consensus as opposed 
to majority rule (Tjosvold & Field, 1983). In contrast 
to this, high levels of commitment could be detrimental 
to the strategic process at certain points. Too much 
commitment could have engendered too much trust in past 
policies and procedures (Salancik, 1977). It could also 
have kept out important discordant information (Whitney 
& Smith, 1983). Undercommitment may have resulted in an 
internal environment of conflict which could have 
promoted originality and innovation (Randall, 1987) so 
necessary for early stages of a new strategic direction. 
Throughout the commitment literature and research 
the concentration has been on organizational commitment 
which has been portrayed as having three components: (a) 
acceptance of the organization's goals, (b) willingness 
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to exert effort for the organization, and (c) desire to 
maintain membership in the organization. This study 
argued for a more specific commitment to strategic 
priorities as being more important to strategic 
implementation than commitment to the organization in 
general. This would be important in the early stage of 
the strategic process because strong commitment to the 
organization may imply too much trust in past policies 
and procedures (Salancik, 1977). Undercommitment to the 
organization did not necessarily imply undercommitment 
to a strategic priority. Therefore, commitment to the 
priority as opposed to commitment to the organization 
may have been more important to the implementation of a 
new strategy. 
Due to the nature of the top management's role in 
the strategic process, it was expected that top 
management would have exerted extra effort to bring 
about changes in the middle management and the 
organization. It was expected that top management would 
achieve higher levels of commitment to strategic 
priorities than middle management. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis was made: 
Hypothesis 5: Commitment to strategic priorities will be 
greater at higher levels of management. Commitment will 
be greater for top management and lower for middle 
management. 
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Furthsr, commitiiiGnt could b© ©nhanc©d by a nuinb©r 
of factors: satisfaction with the level of 
Participation, political access, belief in the soundness 
of a decision, and ability to see the connection to 
personal goals (Guth & MacMillan, 1986; Alutto & Acito, 
1974; Cook & Wall, 1980; Buchanan, 1975; Mohrman, 1979). 
For example, complexity in the environment 
increases the number of factors likely to be critical 
for performing the task. This leads to more unstructured 
problems and solutions do not follow as logically from 
available information. This may lead to the soundness 
of the decision being suspect. A broader forum would 
deal with the greater information needs of the more 
complex environment. However, the individual's access 
to a broader forum for discussing his/her job needs 
under complexity would allow for complex understanding 
of the problems and solutions of their job situations. 
Participation in the strategic process would, therefore, 
increase commitment in a complex environment by 
increasing belief in the soundness of the decisions. 
While it might seem that participation techniques 
would build commitment under nearly simple conditions, 
there are potential problems with this approach. If 
managers perceive an inappropriate level of 
participation in the strategic process, they may lose 
faith in senior management. They may conclude that top 
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management is shirking their job and lacks competence. 
Second, if the managers don’t feel qualified to make 
strategic decisions, they may lack confidence in the 
final decisions resulting from this process (bitterer, 
1987). Finally, the enormous amount of time and energy 
participation takes may create ill will because of a 
sense of wasted time and effort. Using the research 
findings on commitment and the inferences developed from 
the concepts of environmental complexity and 
involvement, the following hypothesis is made: 
Hypothesis 6: In organizations where middle management 
perceives the environment as relatively complex 
commitment to strategic priorities will be positively 
related to perceived involvement in the strategic 
process. When middle management perceives the 
environment as relatively less complex commitment to 
strategic priorities will not be related to perceived 
involvement in the strategic process. 
Interaction of Commitment and Shared Understanding 
Though the previous discussion has pointed out the 
importance of commitment to and shared understanding of 
strategic priorities, the potential dynamics of the 
interaction of varying levels of the two factors is 
important as well (see figure 2). A high level of 
commitment and a high level of shared understanding 
brings about a high level of consensus. This gives the 
organization both the common direction and force needed 
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Figure 2. Configurations of shared understanding and 
commitment (Adapted from Wooldridge and Floyd, 1989, 
p.299). 
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to sustain attempts at implementation or continued 
support of attempts to fulfill priorities. When shared 
understanding of strategy is low but commitment is high, 
there may be well intentioned but ill informed behaviors 
and decisions leading to less intentional strategy being 
present in the "realized” strategy. When understanding 
is high but commitment is low, there may be "counter 
effort" (Guth & MacMillan, 1986) and cynicism negatively 
affecting performance. When both are low, there will be 
very weak consensus. 
Consensus: Process stage 
Earlier discussion dealt with the factors of 
commitment and understanding across different 
situations. These factors may also have changed across 
time in the same situation. The stage of the strategic 
process could have a great effect across time. 
Alternative strategic processes determine the stages 
found and their sequence and, therefore, affect 
commitment and understanding over time. The rational 
model described activities which included goal 
identification, alternative generation, analysis, 
evaluation, and choice (Andrews, 1971). The incremental 
model (Quinn, 1980; Narayanan & Fahey, 1982) was more of 
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a political process set with the forming of small 
coalitions who foster and nourish an idea or concept and 
obtaining agreement from top management on its adoption 
as a direction for the company. 
Under the rational model top management simply 
made a choice based on detailed analysis and the rest of 
the implementation was simply done through edict. 
Consensus was likely to be high within the top 
management early in the process because of their access 
to the logic of the decision but the consensus was not 
likely to be present at lower levels. As the results of 
the implementation of a particular strategy become 
known, its positive effect on the performance of the 
firm could increase the commitment of the lower level 
managers to the strategy because positive firm 
performance would often affect their bonus pay 
situation, promotion availability and at the very least, 
job security because the firm was likely to remain in 
business if it was performing well. 
For the incremental model, high consensus of the 
top management team was not likely to be present in the 
early stages because the strategic idea and concept was 
likely to be located at a lower level management 
situation where there was likely to be high consensus 
among the initial coalition members at the early stage 
and little or no consensus among the top management 
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team. Later stages would show some increase in the 
consensus of the top management team but would never 
reach the high consensus of the top management team of 
an organization using the rational approach. 
Selected decision making techniques could be used 
at different stages of a process. Devil's advocate and 
dialectic inquiry could be used at early stages of the 
strategic process to obtain more alternatives and 
information (Schweiger, Sandberg, & Ragan, 1986) . After 
the selection of several good alternatives, the process 
could switch to forced consensus which brings about 
higher acceptance of the decision (Schweiger, Sandberg, 
& Ragan, 1986) making implementation easier. 
In Stagner's (1969) study, firms at both the bottom 
and top third of profitability showed high cohesiveness. 
This conflicting finding could have been due to 
importance of consensus coming at the appropriate stage. 
Too early consensus could bring about the phenomena of 
"groupthink" (Janis, 1972; Allison, 1971) and result in 
low performance. Further, when performance is good 
there is little desire for change (Grinyer & Norburn, 
1977-78) and most of the various options available under 
slack conditions may have been played out. 
Struggling companies in earlier stages would be 
searching for new solutions to their problems and the 
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management would be anxious for change (Grinyer & 
Norburn, 1977-78) and pring about conflicts. If the 
industry as a whole was struggling, it was likely that 
there would have been "breaks” in the industry 
environment, which has been shown to lower agreement 
(Grinyer & Norburn, 1977-78) . Therefore, the following 
hypothesis is given: 
Hypothesis 7: Agreement with the CEO will be higher for 
firms in later stages of the strategic process than for 
firms in early stages. 
In summary, environment should affect the 
appropriateness of strategic processes. The effect of 
the strategic processes should be measured under 
differing conditions across time. Further, the 
consensus effect should be measured in terms of content, 
degree, and scope. The hypotheses are reviewed below: 
Hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: Perceived involvement in the strategic 
process will be greater at higher levels of management. 
Top management will perceive higher levels of 
involvement in the strategic process. Middle management 
will perceive lower levels of involvement in the 
strategic process. 
Hypothesis 2: Involvement in the strategic process will 
be greater for organizations whose top management 
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perceives the environment to be relatively dynamic. 
Involvement in the strategic process will be less for 
organizations whose top management perceives the 
environment to be relatively stable. 
Hypothesis 3: Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater at higher levels of 
management. Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater for top management and lower 
for middle management. 
Hypothesis 4: Perceived individual involvement in the 
strategic process will be positively related to shared 
understanding. Higher levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to higher levels of shared 
understanding. Lower levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to lower levels of shared understanding. 
Hypothesis 5: Commitment to strategic priorities will be 
greater at higher levels of management. Commitment will 
be greater for top management and lower for middle 
management. 
Hypothesis 6: In organizations where middle management 
perceives the environment as relatively complex 
commitment to strategic priorities will be positively 
related to perceived involvement in the strategic 
process. When middle management perceives the 
environment as relatively less complex commitment to 
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strategic priorities will not be related to perceived 
involvement in the strategic process. 
Hypothesis 7. Agreement with the CEO will be greater for 
firms in later stages of the strategic process than for 
firms in early stages. 
CHAPTER III 
METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to describe the 
methodology used to test the hypotheses developed in 
Chapter II. First, the research design, methods and 
strategies for obtaining sample data are covered. Next, 
the instrumentation and variable measurement are 
detailed. Finally, techniques used for the 
operationalization of variables are reported. 
Research Design 
The hypotheses listed at the conclusion of Chapter 
II have not been empirically tested prior to this study. 
The research study used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative procedures. An open-ended interview of the 
CEOs of the firms in the sample obtained the CEO's view 
of the strategic priorities, the strategic process, and 
the business environment of the firm. Following this, a 
survey instrument was administered to the firm's top 
management and middle management. The survey instrument 
measured perceived management process, perceived 
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involvement, commitment to strategic priorities and 
individual understanding of priorities. 
It was hypothesized that the strategic management 
processes used by the firm to establish consensus on 
strategic priorities was related to the organizational 
environment. In order to establish that environments 
have an influence on strategic management processes, two 
widely different settings were selected. 
The survey instrument included both established 
measures and items designed specifically for this study. 
Organizational level (top management versus middle 
management) was established through coding. 
Sample 
In order to observe perceptions within a wide range 
of environments, firms were selected from different 
environmental settings. Dess and Origer (1987) assert 
that uncertainty comes about principally through two 
environmental factors, dynamism and complexity. 
Uncertainty is an important environmental concern 
because uncertainty decreases the possibility of 
obtaining accurate and timely information. High velocity 
(dynamic environments with sharp and discontinuous 
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change) further affect information gathering in the same 
way. 
In general the banking industry can be considered 
high in both dynamism and velocity. The environment is 
one in which competitive information is often 
inaccurate, unavailable or obsolete (Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt, 1988) due to changing competitors, 
technology, and government regulations. 
The banking industry has been operating under a 
continually changing environment since 1973. That year 
brought the end of fixed currency exchange rates and 
1973 through 1982 were characterized by heavy inflation 
(ranging from 5 3/4% to over 15%). Technological 
changes made it possible for the customers to interact 
directly with banking computers (such as ATMs). 
Electronic communications integrated the world's capital 
markets into a single global system. Electronic 
technology in all financial sectors became a necessity 
and increasingly affected greater portions of the 
business. In the mid '70's regulators began a gradual 
process of deregulation. Important deregulation included 
Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary 
Control Act of 1980, the Garn-St. Germain depository 
Institutions Act of 1982, and the July 1985 Supreme 
Court decision upholding the legality of regional 
interstate banking. More recently the 1987 federal 
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court ruling allowed banks to offer both investment and 
brokerage services. Along with this there was a recent 
growing trend of borrowers in distress filing suit 
against the banks under a new legal doctrine known as 
lender s liability. These and other sudden changes have 
made the banking environment very dynamic. 
Medium sized Massachusetts banks with a mutual 
savings history were asked to participate. Ten banks 
accepted (see Table 1 a. pg.57). The remainder of the 
banks (15) sought refused with overburdened staff or 
pending mergers and acquisitions being given as reasons 
for declining. 
To contrast the banks’ dynamic environment, 
manufacturing companies in stable mature industries were 
selected for the second part of the sample (see Table 1 
b. pg.58). Manufacturing firms were selected from the 
New England Guide to Manufacturers. First SEC codes 
denoting mature industries (slow growth businesses 
characterized by continuing stagnant demand and head to 
head competition) were determined. Next, all firms of 
medium size in those codes with headquarters located in 
Massachusetts or Connecticut were contacted and asked to 
participate. Firms asked to participate dealt with the 
manufacture of bedding, textile products, paper 
conversion products and footwear. Most declining firms 
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Table 1 
Organization profiles 
a. Bank profiles 
(OOO's) 
CODE BRANCHES LOANS(NET) DEPOSITS TOTAL 
ASSETS 
RESPONDENTS 
TM MM TOT. 
A 4 266,211 264,073 315,588 8 11 19 
B 8 171,809 202,280 228,494 11 10 21 
C 3 91,545 95,567 111,350 6 5 11 
D 1 90,634 110,393 123,524 8 4 12 
E 3 97,084 111,724 121,405 7 6 13 
F 3 128,329 265,279 340,351 7 9 16 
G 6 128,264 226,389 253,756 9 4 13 
H 2 103,710 135,512 152,082 7 3 10 
I 7 195,733 282,525 325,716 6 5 11 
J 6 265,570 213,123 349,864 10 11 21 
Note: Taken from Polk's Bank Directory Fall 1987 • 
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Table 1 
b. Manufacturer profiles 
CODE SIC EES GROSS SALES PRODUCTS RESPONDENTS 
TM MM TOT. 
K 2322 
2341 
2361 
6500 over $10 mil sleepwear, 
underwear, 
outerwear 
8 5 13 
L 2515 75 betw $1- 10 mil mattresses 5 6 11 
M 2677 625 over $10 mil envelopes 6 6 12 
N 2389 
3143 
3144 
1800 over $10 mil footwear 8 9 17 
0 2621 900 over $10 mil technical 
paper prod 
14 11 25 
P 2299 1300 over $10 mil textiles 8 12 20 
Q 2761 375 over $10 mil printed 6 6 12 
business 
forms 
Note: Taken from New England Manufacturers Directory 
gave overburdened staff and pending mergers as reasons 
for declining. Seven firms accepted. Thirty one firms 
refused. 
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Data Collection 
The researcher obtained qualitative data by 
interviewing each firm's CEO about strategic priorities, 
strategic process and the firm's business environment. 
Using unstructured techniques (Schwartz and Jacobs, 
1979) interviews were formed around a select number of 
open-ended questions (Table 2). The interviews were from 
one to two hours in length. 
Table 2: Open ended questions for CEOS 
1. What are the main strategic priorities of your firm 
(bank)? 
2. What is the strategic process like in your firm 
(bank)? Can you give me some specific examples? 
3. What is of special importance within the 
organization's history? 
4. What is the business environment of the organization 
like? 
5. Is there something about the organization that you 
feel is especially important that hasn't been brought 
out by my previous questions? 
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During the interviews, the CEO selected all 
management individuals who used independent judgement in 
their decision making. These individuals were given the 
survey with a cover letter (see Exhibit 1 and 2 in 
Appendix A) from their CEO. The surveys were returned 
by mail to the researcher in pre-addressed stamped 
envelopes. In addition to asking the CEO to distribute 
the questionnaire under this cover letter, the following 
procedures developed by Heberlain and Baumbartner 
(1978), Alwin, ed. (1977) , Armstrong (1975), Bachrack 
and Scoble (1967), Boek and Lade (1963), and Dillman 
(1978) were used for obtaining a high response rate. 
1. Including a prepaid envelope for the return 
responses to improve the return rate. 
2. A regular stamped envelope to produce a better 
return rate than a business reply envelope. 
3. Questionnaire required no more than one-half hour 
to complete. 
4. Open-ended questions were avoided. 
The Survey Time Frame 
The interviews and distribution of surveys occurred 
over a period of eight months starting from August 1987. 
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Though the interviews were stretched over this length of 
time each set of surveys from a firm were returned 
within two weeks of their distribution in all 
manufacturing firms and banks. The spread of interviews 
over such a long calendar period occurred because of the 
difficulty in reaching top executives. A letter of 
introduction (see Exhibit 3 in Appendix A) was followed 
by a series of phone calls by the researcher over a 
period of time to reach various executives to get their 
response to being included in the study. 
The Research Instrument 
The questionnaire was developed through a deductive 
process of reviewing prior related research, developing 
specific hypotheses, and bringing this information 
together in a five part survey instrument. A panel of 
three academic researchers and five business executives 
reviewed and critiqued the instrument and suggested 
critical modifications regarding question wording, 
instruction and instrument design. The final revised 
questionnaire (see exhibit 2 in Appendix A) was again 
reviewed by the panel. No additional changes were 
suggested. Two forms were designed with slight changes 
to wording that distinguished banks from manufacturing 
firms. The word "bank" replaced the word "firm" for 
62 
forms being sent to banks. The instrument was 
unobtrusively coded to distinguish each organization and 
the hierarchical rank of the individual answering the 
questionnaire. 
The following sections give an explanation of 
each measure used in the survey instrument. 
Environment 
In an effort to develop measurements for an 
organization's task environment. Dess and Beard (1984) 
conducted a factor analysis that reduced the 
codification of 6 environmental dimensions to three, 
dynamism, complexity, and munificence. Together, 
dynamism and complexity were the factors most affecting 
uncertainty. 
Several writers recognized environmental perception 
as key to the strategic process (Aguilar, 1967; Anderson 
& Paine, 1975; Andrews, 1971; Bourgeois, 1980; Hambrick, 
1982; Uyterhoeven, Ackerman, & Rosenblum, 1977) and 
several have specifically concerned themselves with the 
perceptions of strategy-level executives (Khandwalla, 
1976; Paine & Anderson, 1977; Hatten & Schendel, 1975; 
Bourgeois, 1985). This study measured the managers' 
perceived environmental dynamism and complexity. 
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Perceived environmental dynamism and complexity were 
measured by Likert-type scale ratings that answered the 
question "How would you describe the business 
environment in which your firm competes? Please circle 
your choices." The perceived dynamism was measured on a 
scale of one to seven with one being "Very Stable" and 
seven being "Very Dynamic". The perceived complexity was 
measured on a scale of one to seven with one being "Very 
Simple" and seven being "Very Complex" (see Exhibit 2 
in Appendix A). 
Strategic Processes 
To measure the nature of the strategic process two 
studies based on actual observations of managers were 
used to determine aspects the individuals might be 
involved in and the overall effect to the organization 
of various levels of participation in the strategic 
process. Using Brodwin's and Bourgeois' (1984) five 
patterns of strategic formulation and implementation, 
four statements identifying unique characteristics of 
each approach were given to the manager-respondent to 
select one statement that best represents his/her 
organization. Statements labeled 1 through 4 in the 
questionnaire represent those characteristics. 
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Respondents were asked to check the blank next to 
the statement that most closely described their firm. 
Question 5 is a paraphrased Likert (1967) question 
used to determine the perceived level of overall 
strategic management involvement. Respondents were 
asked to circle a number from one to nine. Higher 
numbers were associated with descriptions of high 
participation and lower numbers were associated with 
lower levels of participation (see Exhibit 2 in 
Appendix A). 
Involvement in the Process 
Questions 6, 1, 8, 9, and 10 were included to 
measure the individual's perception of personal 
involvement in the strategic process. These statements 
were devised from Nutt's (1986, 1987) research on 
implementation. He presented the premise that 
individuals may be active in the strategic process at 
different steps along the way as well as in different 
degrees of involvement in those steps. This gives 
participation a two dimensional possibility: type and 
degree. The individual was asked to rate the statements 
on a 7 point Likert-type scale ranging from "fully 
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involved" to "not involved at all" (see Exhibit 2 in 
Appendix A). 
Couitaent 
Porter, Steers, Mowday, and Boulian (1974) 
developed an instruaent to measure organizational 
couitaent. The type of commitment measured was global. 
It attempted to measure the individual's commitment to 
the general values of the organization. It also measured 
the respondent's desire to remain with the organization. 
Angle and Perry (1981) factor analyzed the questions 
fairly distinctly between two factors: value commitment 
and commitment to stay. For the measurement of 
commitment in this study, the value commitment factor 
items were selected and adjusted to fit the more 
specific commitment to strategic priorities. The result 
was the organizational commitment section of the 
questionnaire: statements 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 
18, and 19. The manager-respondent was as)ced to rate 
the statements on a 7 point Li)cert-type scale ranging 
from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" (see 
Exhibit 2 in Appendix A). 
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Understanding 
The statements numbered 20 and 21 in the 
questionnaire are priority statements based on Deising's 
(1962) managerial priorities. Porter’s (1980) market 
differentiation, and product and process 
differentiation. The respondents were asked to rank 
order and weight the following priorities from 1 to 5 
by assigning the top priority a one and the least 
priority a 5: 
A. the development of new products and services, B. 
organizational coordination and control, C. the 
development of efficient operating procedures and 
capabilities. D. the development of a committed and 
motivated work force E. the development of a high 
quality customer base. 
These priorities were also weighted by the 
respondents according to their relative importance to 
the success of the firm. The respondents were asked to 
allocate up to but not more than 10 points to the set of 
5 priorities listed above. The greater the importance to 
the organization the larger the weight the respondent 
gave (see Exhibit 2 in Appendix A). Particular note was 
taken of the ranks and weights given by the CEO of the 
respondent’s firm or bank. 
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Operationalization of Variables 
The proposed hypotheses involved two levels of 
analysis. Hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5 involved testing at 
the individual level and hypotheses 2, 6 and 7 involved 
testing at the organizational level. Therefore, some of 
the variables were measured at the individual level, 
some were measured at the organizational level and some 
were measured at both levels. In the following section 
the individual level measures will be discussed first. 
Then variables measured at both the individual and 
organizational level are discussed and finally, the 
organizational level variables are discussed. 
Individual Variables 
Perceived Involvement in the Strategic Process. 
Statements numbered 6 through 10 on the questionnaire 
represent key elements of a major strategic step as 
defined by Nutt's studies (1986, 1987). 
The statements measuring perceived involvement were 
reversed scored. Therefore, each of the response values 
was subtracted from the constant 8 (Dess, 1987). For 
each individual, perceived involvement was measured by 
adding these scores across the five statements. The sum 
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of the five scores was divided by five to obtain a 
single perceived involvement score for each individual. 
Management Level. Management level in the 
oi^^snization was determined at the time of the interview 
with the CEO. The CEO and his immediate subordinates 
were identified and given coded questionnaires for the 
two highest levels of management. In addition, each CEO 
identified an additional level of management. For each 
level the CEO was asked to identify only those 
individuals who exercised independent judgement when 
making decisions. Questionnaires were unobtrusively 
coded and distributed to the appropriate managerial 
level. The top two levels were identified as the top 
management team (TMT) within the study. The other level 
was identified as middle management (MM). 
Individual and Organizational Variables 
Commitment. Nine statements (11 through 19) in the 
questionnaire asked the manager-respondent to rate 
his/her commitment to the top priority of the 
organization. A principle components factor analysis of 
the nine questions was executed and only one factor was 
discovered. In addition, the Cronbach alpha reliability 
index was .91. Therefore, a measure of commitment to 
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organizational priority for each respondent was derived 
by taking the mean score across the nine commitment 
items. The mean of the individual commitment levels of 
the organizations was derived by taking the mean scores 
across all individuals responding from the organization. 
Perceived Environmental Uncertainty. To measure 
perceived environmental uncertainty, the individual was 
asked to answer the question "How would you describe the 
business environment in which your firm competes?" using 
Likert scale answers ranging from "very stable" to "very 
dynamic" and "very simple" to "very complex". The scales 
used ranged from one to seven. For hypotheses 2a, 2b, 
4a, 4b standardized Z-scores of these two measures were 
derived and the sample was split into two categories for 
each dimension. Respondents with a Z-score greater than 
or equal to zero for perceived dynamism were placed in 
the dynamic category. Respondents with Z-scores of less 
than zero for perceived dynamism were placed in the 
simple category. Respondents with Z-scores greater than 
or equal to zero for perceived complexity were placed in 
the complex category and those with Z-scores less than 
zero were placed in the simple category. The 
organization's score for each of the environmental 
factors was determined by obtaining the mean score 
across all of the responding managers for each 
organization for each of these factors. 
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Organizational Variables 
Involvement in the Strategic Process. Each 
responding manager was asked to identify the "way you 
feel the firm's strategic priorities are established." 
The respondent was asked to rate the organization for 
this answer on a Likert-scale of 1 to 9 with ranges 
identified as "Upper management issues orders" to 
"Orders: comments invited" to "After discussion, orders" 
to "Usually by group action." An organizational score 
was determined by taking the mean across all managers 
responding from the particular organization. This scale 
is a paraphrase of Likert's (1967) scale for determining 
the system of organization based on the manner in which 
goal-setting or ordering is done. 
Shared Understanding. Shared understanding was 
operationalized by attempting to measure the consistency 
of the ratings of the five priority statements based on 
Deising's (1962) typology of priorities and Porter's 
(1980) priority of market differentiation. Shared 
understanding was derived from this ranking and 
weighting of the priorities across each organization. A 
technique to measure the level of agreement among 
academic paper evaluators (Bowen, Perloff and Jacoby, 
1972) was used as a basis for this measure. A weighted 
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rank was developed for each of the priorities by 
multiplying the respondent's assigned weight by the 
reverse score of the rank. Therefore, a priority 
weighted at 7 and ranked number one would receive a 
reverse score of five for the rank and seven for the 
weight and would, therefore, have a weighted rank of 
thirty-five for a priority. Standardized Z-scores of 
the five priorities were derived for each organization. 
Finally the absolute value of the Z-scores of these 
weighted rankings of priorities were summed for each 
individual. Each organization's mean of the individual 
sums of the z-score of the 5 priorities is considered to 
be the "shared understanding" measure of each 
organization. 
Agreement with the CEO on Strategic Priorities. CEO 
agreement was operationalized in a similar manner to 
Shrared Understanding. However, instead of comparing each 
individual's weighted ranking with the mean of the 
weighted rankings of the five priorities within each 
organization, the individual's weighted ranking was 
compared to the CEO's weighted ranking of the 
priorities. 
The absolute value of the difference between 
the manager-respondent's weighted ranking and the CEO s 
was determined for each priority. Since this is a 
measure of the disparity between the CEO's ranking and 
72 
the manager-respondent’s, the score was subtracted from 
a constant to obtain "agreement" with the CEO. The mean 
of these agreement scores across the priorities was 
derived for each respondent and the mean for the 
respondents for each organization was found as well. 
Strategic Process Stage. Each organization was 
assigned a classification of either early, middle or 
late in the strategic process based on the responses of 
the CEO to a range of open-ended guestions during an 
hour long interview concerning their strategic process. 
"Early" was assigned to organizations which indicated 
that they were pursuing the development of a new 
strategic direction from what had existed for the past 
few years. Generally "early" organizations did not have 
well formed strategic priorities and were still in the 
process of doing such things as market studies and 
employee surveys. "Late" organizations had well formed 
strategic directions and were only making minor 
modifications in those directions. These organizations 
had their current strategies in place for a number of 
years. "Middle" organizations described their strategic 
direction as having been determined but that they were 
getting feedback on the choice of the direction and they 
were having to make substantial adjustments in the 
directions based on these feedbacks. 
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Qualitative Analysis 
Scatterplots (Scattergraas) 
Because of the exploratory nature of this study, 
additional analysis tools were considered to develop a 
greater understanding of the strategic processes of the 
firms in the study. The tool selected was the 
scattergram or scatterplot, sometimes called an X by Y 
plot (Kidder, 1981). The scatterplot is extremely useful 
for understanding relationships between variables. The 
type used for this analysis combined aspects of the 
frequency distribution and a two dimension graph. 
According to Kerlinger (1973, p.l42) "distributions, 
li)ce graphs.. .have probably been too little used in the 
behavioral sciences." Frequency distributions allow for 
the study of unusual conditions. The graph "vividly and 
uniquely describes a relation" (Kerlinger, 1973 p. 
143) . 
A profile analysis approach was used to review the 
scatterplots. A rigorous statistical analysis was not 
done on the information. A visual assessment of the 
similarities of the profiles of each of the 
organizations too)c into account the shape of the profile 
and ‘scatter* (differences in the variability) of the 
profile. Not using calculated measures at this point 
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maintains certain information about the data that can 
enrich the analysis. This changes the research study 
from a black box' and allows some limited view of the 
inside of the 'box'. 
The construction of the scatterplots is 
straight forward. One variable of interest is plotted on 
the horizontal (X) axes and the other variable of 
interest is plotted on the vertical (Y) axis. The data 
set is of the (X,Y) variety. For each occurrence of a 
bivariate pair, one point is plotted on the diagram. 
Because of the incorporation of frequency, multiple 
cases of bivariate pairs are signified by different 
symbols when plotting. Therefore, in the graphs, the 
occurrence of 1, 2, 3, or more than 3 pairs at a given 
location is distinguishable. Each graph of pairs of 
variables used the same dimensioning to allow direct 
comparisons across organizations. 
Four sets of scatterplots were used for the 
analysis. Three sets used the variable 'management 
level' for the horizontal (X) axis and the variables 
"perceived involvement", "commitment" and "agreement" 
for each of the vertical (Y) axes. The fourth set of 
plots used "perceived involvement" for the horizontal 
(X) axis and "shared understanding" for the vertical (Y) 
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axis. These were observed for common or unusual 
patterns that showed a relationship to the interview 
data. 
CHAPTER IV 
PRESENTATION OF RESEARCH RESULTS 
Introduction 
This chapter presents the results of the study in 
two parts. The first section uses the survey data to 
test the hypotheses. The second section discusses the 
important variables in the hypotheses using information 
obtained during the CEO interview of each of the firms 
in the survey in conjunction with scatterplots of the 
variables. (Detailed descriptions of each of the 
organizations can be found in Appendix B. Scatterplots 
referred to in the analysis can be found in Appendix C.) 
Chapter V will discuss the implication of these results 
for the field of strategic management. 
Hypothesis Testing 
Hypothesis 1; Perceived involvement in the strategic 
process will be greater at higher levels of management. 
Top management will perceive higher levels of 
involvement in the strategic process. Middle management 
will perceive lower levels of involvement in the 
strategic process. 
To test hypothesis 1, a one-way ANOVA was performed 
with perceived involvement as the dependent variable and 
the level of management as the independent variable. 
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The sample was split into two groups. One group 
consisted of top management and the second group 
consisted of middle management. Support for this 
hypothesis would have shown a higher mean for perceived 
involvement for individuals at the top level of 
management, and a lower mean for the middle level of 
management surveyed. The between groups F probability 
would be below .06 to be significant. Table 3 {pg.78) 
presents the results of the ANOVA analysis and the 
related cell means and standard deviations. Results 
show a significant effect showing very strong support 
for the hypothesis. Table 3 (pg.78) shows an F 
probability of <.001. and a mean of 5.04 for top 
management and 3.97 for middle management. 
Hypothesis 2: Involvement in the strategic process will 
be greater for organizations whose top management 
perceives the environment to be relatively dynamic. 
Involvement in the strategic process will be less for 
organizations whose top management perceives the 
environment to be relatively stable. 
Hypothesis 2 was tested using a one-way analysis of 
variance using the overall level of involvement in each 
organization as the dependent variable and top 
managements' perception of environmental dynamism as the 
independent variable. The sample of organizations was 
split into two groups. Organizations whose top 
management had a mean value greater than or equal to 
zero for the standardized z-scores of their perception 
78 
TABLE 3 
Summary of ANOVA results: 
perceived involvement according to management level 
Source df MS F Ratio F Prob. 
Between Groups 1 71.2707 30.0810 .0000 
Within Groups 248 2.3693 
Total 249 
Cell means and standard deviations: 
perceived involvement according to management level 
Management N Perceived 
Level Involvement 
Top Management 130 
Mean 5.04 
Standard deviation 1.47 
Middle Management 120 
Mean 3.97 
Standard deviation 1.61 
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of environmental dynamism were placed in the dynamic 
category. Organizations whose top management had a mean 
value less than zero for the standardized z-scores of 
their perception of environmental dynamism were placed 
in the stable category. Support for this hypothesis 
would have shown between group significance with F 
probability <.05 and a higher level of involvement mean 
for the organizations whose managers perceive higher 
dynamism in the environment. 
The analysis showed an F ratio of 6.02 under the 
dynamism factor which was significant at F probability 
<.05 (see Table 4 pg.80). The dynamic group had an 
involvement level mean of 5.00 (indicating high 
participation in the decision making process of the 
organization). The stable group had an involvement level 
mean of 3.63. This shows support for hypothesis two. 
Hypothesis 3: Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater at higher levels of 
management. Agreement with the CEO on strategic 
priorities will be greater for top management and lower 
for middle management. 
Hypothesis three was tested using a one-way 
analysis of variance using CEO agreement as the 
dependent variable and level of management as the 
independent variable. The sample was split into two 
groups. One group consisted of top management and the 
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Table 4 
Summary of ANOVA results: 
involvement level according to level of dynamism 
Source df MS F Ratio F Prob. 
Between Groups 
Within Groups 
1 
15 
7.8932 
1.3105 
6.0231 .0268 
Total 16 
Cell 
involvement 
means 
level 
and standard deviations: 
according to level of dynamism 
Factor Level Involvement 
N 
Dynamic 9 
mean 5.00 
std. dev. 1.30 
Stable 8 
mean 3.63 
std. dev. .94 
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second group consisted of middle management. Support for 
this hypothesis would have shown between groups 
significance with F probability <.05 and a higher mean 
for top management than middle management. The analysis 
showed an F ratio of 4.99 that was significant at 
probability <.05 (see Table 5 pg.82). Top management 
had a mean of 12.76 which was significantly more than 
the mean of 11.70 for the middle management group. This 
shows clear support for hypothesis three. 
Hypothesis 4: Perceived individual involvement in the 
strategic process will be positively related to shared 
understanding. Higher levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to higher levels of shared 
understanding. Lower levels of perceived involvement 
will be related to lower levels of shared understanding. 
Hypothesis four was tested by observing the 
correlations between shared understanding of each of the 
priorities, the total shared understanding and perceived 
involvement. As Table 6 (pg.83) shows, no significant 
correlations were found. Thus, the results provide 
no support for hypothesis four. 
Hypothesis 5: Commitment to strategic priorities will be 
greater at higher levels of management. Commitment will 
be greater for top management and lower for middle 
management. 
Hypothesis five was tested using a one-way analysis 
of variance using commitment to priorities as the 
dependent variable and level of management as the 
independent variable. The sample was split into two 
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Table 5 
Summary of ANOVA results: 
agreement with the CEO according to management level 
Source df MS F Ratio F Prob. 
Between Groups 1 72.0905 4.9993 .0262 
Within Groups 251 14.4201 
Total 252 
Cell 
agreement with 
means 
the 
and standard deviations: 
CEO according to management level 
Management 
Level 
Agreement 
with the CEO 
N 
Top 131 
Mean 12.76 
Standard deviation 4.11 
Middle 122 
Mean 11.70 
Standard deviation 3.42 
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Table 6 
Correlations between 
shared understanding of strategic priorities 
and perceived involvement 
Strategic Priorities 
New Product and Service Development -.03 
(N=248) 
Organizational Coordination and Control -.00 
(N=248) 
Efficient Procedures and Capabilities Dev. .06 
(N=248) 
Committed and Motivated Workforce Development -.10 
(N=248) 
High Quality Customer Base Development .07 
(N=248) 
Overall Understanding -.04 
(N=248) 
No significant correlations. 
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groups. One group consisted of top management and the 
second group consisted of middle management. Support for 
the hypothesis would have shown an F ratio significant 
at F probability <.05 and a commitment mean 
significantly higher for top management than for middle 
management. The F ratio of .22 (see Table 7 pg.85) was 
not significant and the commitment means of the two 
groups were essentially the same. Top management had a 
mean of 5.7 and middle management had a mean of 5.6 
showing no support for hypothesis five. 
Hypothesis 6: In organizations where middle management 
perceives the environment as relatively complex, 
commitment to strategic priorities will be positively 
related to perceived involvement in the strategic 
process. When middle management perceives the 
environment as relatively less complex commitment to 
strategic priorities will not be related to perceived 
involvement in the strategic process. 
Hypothesis six was tested at the organizational 
level by observing the correlations of middle 
managements' perceived involvement in each organization 
with the commitment to strategic priorities of the 
middle management. The sample of organizations was 
split into two groups. Organizations whose middle 
management had a mean value greater than or equal to 
zero for the standardized z-scores of their perception 
of environmental complexity were placed in the complex 
category. Organizations whose middle management had a 
mean value less than zero for the standardized z-scores 
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Table 7 
Summary of ANOVA results: 
commitment to strategic priorities 
according to management level 
Source df MS F Ratio F Prob. 
Between Groups 1 .2527 .2181 .6410 
Within Groups 228 1.1588 
Total 229 
Cell means and standard deviations: 
commitment to strategic priorities 
according to management level 
Management 
Level to 
Commitment 
Strategic Priorities 
N 
Top 124 
Mean 5.66 
Standard deviation 1.05 
Middle 106 
Mean 5.60 
Standard deviation 1.11 
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of their perception of environmental dynamism were 
placed in the simple category. Support for the 
hypothesis would have shown significant positive 
correlation of perceived involvement with commitment 
under high levels of complexity. It would have shown no 
significant correlations with low levels of complexity 
(simple). There was clear support for the hypothesis. 
Under complexity, (.8839, p<.01) perceived involvement 
is significantly correlated for the complex group but 
not significantly correlated (.0754) for the simple 
group (See Table 8). 
Table 8 
Correlations of 
perceived involvement with commitment 
Environmental Factors N 
Complexity 
Complex 8 .8839* * 
Simple 9 .0754 
* p<.01 
Hypothesis 7: Agreement with the CEO will be greater for 
firms in later stages of the strategic process than for 
firms in early stages. 
To test for hypothesis 7, a one-way ANOVA was 
performed. The dependent variable was agreement with 
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the CEO and the independent variable was the process 
stage. The sample was split into three groups (see 
Table 9 pg.88). One group consisted of organizations in 
the "early" stages in the strategic process. The third 
group consisted of organizations in the middle of the 
strategic process. The third group consisted of 
organizations in the "late" stages of the strategic 
process. Only the "early" group and the "late" group 
were included in the analysis. Support for the 
hypothesis would have shown an F ratio significant at 
probability of <.05 and the group means for agreement 
with the CEO should be higher for late in the process 
stage and lower for early in the process stage. There 
was no support for this hypothesis (see Table 10 pg.89). 
The F ratio of .07 was not significant and the 
means for agreement with the CEO on strategic priorities 
for the two groups of early and late process stage were 
essentially the same. Early process stage organizations 
had a mean of 11.23 and late process stage organizations 
had a mean of 11.39 (see Table 10 pg.89). 
To summarize results from the quantitative survey 
data, hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 6 were supported. 
Hypotheses 4, 5, and 7 were not supported by the 
quantitative data. 
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Table 9 
Organization level results 
CODE INVOLVEMENT 
LEVEL 
TOP 
MANAGEMENT 
DYNAMISM 
MIDDLE 
MANAGEMENT 
COMPLEXITY 
AGREEMENT 
WITH 
CEO 
PROCESS 
STAGE 
BANKS 
A 5 -.77 .17 8.57 EARLY 
B 3 -.08 -.08 8.79 LATE 
C 3 -.18 -.91 9.87 EARLY 
D 5 .57 -.43 8.28 EARLY 
E 3 -.33 -.51 9.89 LATE 
F 5 .42 .53 7.26 LATE 
G 4 .06 .46 6.34 MIDDLE 
H 3 .42 .38 8.26 LATE 
I 3 .42 -.02 6.98 LATE 
J 4 .77 .11 9.92 MIDDLE 
MANUFACTURERS 
K 5 -.18 .63 10.88 EARLY 
L 4 - .02 1.14 8.96 EARLY 
M 5 .18 .15 9.45 LATE 
N 5 1.31 .46 8.27 EARLY 
0 3 -.62 -.17 9.61 LATE 
P 4 1.01 .25 7.12 EARLY 
Q 6 .42 .12 8.20 EARLY 
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Table 10 
Summary of ANOVA results: 
agreement with the CEO according to process stage 
Source df MS F Ratio F Prob. 
Between Groups 1 .0985 .0742 .7895 
Within Groups 13 17.2491 
Total 14 
Cell means 
agreement with the 
and standard deviations: 
CEO according to process stage 
Process ^ 
Stage 
Agreement with CEO 
N 
Early 
Mean 
8 
11.23 
Standard deviation 1.15 
Late 
Mean 
Standard deviation 
11.39 
1.15 
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Qualitativ0 Analysis of Interviews 
This section will give the insights gained from 
combining the information in the quantitative analysis 
with the qualitative information gained from the 
interviews. This discussion draws on a qualitative 
assessment of interviews appearing in Appendix B and of 
the scatterplots appearing in Appendix C. The focus will 
be on the hypotheses of the study. 
Hypothesis 1 
The quantitative results provided support for the 
hypothesis that perceived involvement in the strategic 
process will be greater at higher levels of management. 
The scatterplots in conjunction with the interviews 
suggest some additional dynamics as well. Though the 
perceived involvement mean for middle management is 
significantly lower than for top management in the 
manufacturing firms, the range for middle management is 
very wide, and some values of perceived involvement are 
as high as top management's. The values for middle 
management also extend lower than for top management 
(such as in Firms P and N). Such results are generally 
found in the banks. The banks show more hierarchical 
structure to the perceived involvement level (such as in 
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Banks C, D and E). This suggests that a portion of the 
middle management in the manufacturing firms may 
actually be very active in the strategic process. 
Several of the firms mention the importance of getting 
information from manufacturing line employees, vendors 
and operators as part of the information process needed 
for good strategic management. It is perhaps the 
acceptance of good input at this level that leads to the 
perception of higher involvement on the part of 
management that is dealing with this level. 
Hypothesis 2 
The quantitative results provide support for the 
hypothesis that involvement in the strategic process 
will be greater for organizations whose top management 
perceives the environment to be relatively dynamic. 
Means of the individual firms (see Table 9 pg.88) showed 
the same pattern. Bank A appears to be an exception to 
the hypothesis. They have the lowest perceived dynamism 
of all organizations but have a very high level of 
involvement. This bank president suggested that being 
"democratic" was merely a preference of influential 
executives of the organization based on their earlier 
experience with one of the original banks before the 
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merger of two banks to make this one. There was no 
suggestion in the interview that this choice was 
influenced by the environment or the particular strategy 
chosen by the firm. 
Hypothesis 3 
The quantitative results provide support for the 
hypothesis that top management is in higher agreement on 
the strategic priorities than middle management. Given 
the support for this hypothesis, one might conclude a 
lack of constructive dissension at the top of the 
organization. The scatterplots (see CEO Agreement by 
Management Level Plots in Appendix C) and insights from 
several of the interviews (see Appendix B) show nothing 
of the kind, however. In the scatterplots top 
management is separated into two levels. Level 1 are the 
very closest to the CEO and level two generally work 
directly with the CEO but are a level lower in the 
hierarchy. The individuals at the level of the CEO 
(level 1) show a wide range of agreement with the CEO. 
Many of the CEOs seem to encourage a range of opinions. 
For example. Bank A considers itself "more democratic" 
than "unilateral". In firm M, the president feels it is 
his job not to make the decisions but to remove 
constraints from the thinking of the individual 
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managers. At firm 0, even though everyone must buy into 
the three year plan, the CEO believes that the 
"maverick" must be encouraged to speak out and should be 
listened to. There apparently is a "maverick" in this 
organization and the scatterplot shows the widest range 
of agreement at level 1 of all organizations in the 
study. Two organizations do not have a wide range of 
agreement at this level, Bank I and Bank J. The 
interviews for these two organizations seemed to show a 
closeness within these two top management groups that 
went beyond the work setting to a more social setting. 
Bank I was run as a triumvirate with a great deal of 
teasing and joking among the three. Bank J was formed 
by the top management group that knew each other 
socially so that they might work together and provide an 
organizational setting that would eliminate the danger 
of being bought out and ending up with new management. 
Hypothesis 4_ 
The quantitative results did not provide support 
for the hypothesis that shared understanding would be 
related to perceived involvement. The scatterplots of 
the two variables of shared understanding with perceived 
involvement showed a wide range of patterns for the 
94 
various organizations. No organization had high shared 
understanding and relatively low perceived involvement. 
Four organizations had fairly high shared understanding 
among all individuals (Bank H, Firm K, Firm O, and Firm 
P). Three of these firms (Firms K, O and P) use outside 
consultants for environmental information for making 
decisions within the top management teams (see Appendix 
B). The fourth (Bank H) does not mention using outside 
consultants but specifically mentioned having the top 
management team do environmental analysis before making 
major strategic decisions for the year. Most of the 
firms with lower shared understanding had a wide range 
of perceived involvement. One bank (Bank C) had very low 
morale which the CEO admitted was due to his style of 
management in which he controlled and made just about 
every decision in the bank including salary increases of 
the tellers. The scatterplot for this bank indicates 
low shared understanding as well as low perceived 
involvement. 
Hypothesis 5 
The quantitative results did not provide support 
for the hypothesis that commitment would be related to 
management level. The scatterplots do not support this 
across most of the organizations. Commitment is 
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somewhat high at most levels. Three organizations (Bank 
C, Bank H, and Bank J) have unique patterns to the 
scatterplots of commitment with hierarchical level. 
Bank C has somewhat low commitment overall. This is the 
bank experiencing low morale problems. Bank I has 
somewhat low commitment overall. This is the bank run 
as a triumvirate. Observing Bank I's commitment with 
management level chart, two members of level 2 perceive 
even less involvement than level 3 which contains all of 
middle management. It is possible that this triumvirate 
is creating negative feelings in the individuals 
reporting to the triumvirate which in turn may create 
low commitment. Bank H showed a hierarchical structure 
to commitment levels. This was the only instance where 
the hypothesis held true within an organization. In 
this bank the CEO claims that he buffers himself from 
the rest of the organization and allows his immediate 
staff to handle everything and encourages them to allow 
the levels below them to do the same. 
Hypothesis 6 
The quantitative results provided support for the 
hypothesis that when middle management's perception of 
the environment is complex, perceived level of 
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involvement will be positively related to commitment. No 
insights could be gained into hypothesis six from the 
interviews or scatterplots. 
Hypothesis 7 
The quantitative results did not provide support 
for the hypothesis that agreement with the CEO on 
strategic priorities would be related to strategic 
process stage. Neither the scatterplots nor the 
interviews provided support for the hypothesis. 
Referring again to the constructive dissension noticed 
when reviewing the scatterplots for hypothesis three, 
only two firms displayed relatively high consistent CEO 
agreement (Banks I and J) in top management. This 
suggests that disagreement with the CEO may serve an 
important function at all stages of the strategic 
process. As such, it is encouraged by many of the CEOs 
interviewed. 
In summary, the data suggest support for several of 
the hypotheses but the interviews suggest that simple 
application of this data could miss additional insights. 
A thorough understanding of the situation is important 
to understanding the meaning of the data. 
CHAPTER V 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Restatement of Study Objectives 
This study explored consensus on strategic 
priorities among top and middle level managers. The 
focus was primarily on the role consensus played in the 
strategic decision process. In prior studies there have 
been conflicting results on the value of consensus in 
achieving high strategic performance. In this study the 
assumption was not made that consensus was "good" for 
strategy. Therefore, there was no emphasis on firm 
performance. Rather, the emphasis was in developing 
appropriate measures of the consensus constructs and 
determining important factors in the strategic decision 
making process that affect consensus. 
The hypotheses proposed that perceived involvement 
in the strategic process and commitment to strategic 
priorities would be greater at higher levels of 
management. The hypotheses also suggested that top 
management's perception of a dynamic environment would 
lead to increased levels of involvement in the 
organization. The hypotheses further proposed that top 
management would be in closer agreement with the CEO on 
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strategic priorities than middle management would and 
that this agreement would be greater for firms in the 
late stages of the strategic process. The hypotheses 
suggested that higher levels of perceived involvement 
would be related to higher levels of shared 
understanding. Finally, the hypotheses proposed 
that when middle management, perceives a complex 
environment, greater levels of perceived involvement 
would be related to increased commitment. 
Major Findings 
Hypothesis 1 
The study supported the theory that the level of 
management related to the level of perceived involvement 
in the strategic process. Mintzberg's (1978) separation 
of intended and emergent influences suggested a stronger 
role in the strategic process for top management than 
for middle management. The results of this study 
indicated that top management perceived a higher level 
of involvement in the strategic process than did middle 
management. This higher perception of involvement would 
be indicative of a greater role if the perceptions of 
the management were a fairly accurate representation of 
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the situation. The parallel finding that middle 
management perceived lower levels of involvement in the 
strategic process was supportive of the research 
(Litterer et al.,1985; Burgleman, 1983, Narayanan and 
Fahey, 1982) that suggested even though middle 
management may have a strong effect on strategy their 
perception of their involvement was very narrow because 
of their having to deal with specific problems in 
situations. 
Nutt's (1987) research also suggested the 
possibility of a wide range of involvement of middle 
management in the process. This study used Nutt's 
wording to describe the varied portions of involvement 
and quantified the level of management's perception. 
Though there was a significant difference between the 
means of the perceived levels of involvement in the 
strategic process, middle management perceived 
"moderate" involvement rather than low involvement. 
Though lower than top management's perception of 
involvement, the moderate level would indicate support 
for Nutt's descriptive findings of a wider level of 
involvement within the strategic process for middle 
management. 
Narayanan and Fahey's (1982) coalition model 
suggested that Quinn's (1978) logical incrementalism was 
a more appropriate description of the process than that 
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implied in the analytical scheme of the strategic 
process. Narayanan and Fahey (1982, p.32) suggest that 
formulating the content of strategy inevitably entails 
managing its context and processes.” This study has 
contributed to an understanding of this by measuring the 
scope of perceived strategic involvement within the 
organizational context. 
Hypothesis 2 
The results of this study support the theory that 
perceptions of the environment have an effect on the 
process of building consensus on strategic priorities. 
Within the study limitations the findings indicate that 
when top management perceives the environment to be 
relatively dynamic, involvement in the strategic process 
will be higher. 
Vroom and Yetton's (1973) results were not 
conclusive in their attempt to establish the validity of 
their model. Their model suggested that managers were 
not "participative” or "autocratic” but that situations 
were "participative” or "autocratic”. Their model did 
not suggest situational factors that would determine 
management's selection of participation levels. The 
findings of this study suggest that perceived level of 
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dynamism by top management affects who is involved in 
the strategic process. 
Brodwin and Bourgeois (1984, 1985) found that 
reduction of uncertainty was dysfunctional in the 
dynamic environment. If there was a greater need for 
more complex information for decision making as there is 
in a dynamic environment, increasing participation in 
the organization would increase the numbers of 
alternative views. In their qualitative study, Brodwin 
and Bourgeois (1984) found several typical management 
styles that included various levels of participation. 
Brodwin and Bourgeois developed prescriptive styles for 
environmental situations based on the match of the 
management task in various settings to the typical 
patterns they found in their study. They suggest that 
dynamism increases the level of participation needed in 
the organization. The present study suggested that top 
management would try to match their information needs 
and, therefore, select appropriate decision making 
techniques that would include increased levels of 
participation when perceived environmental dynamism was 
high. The study indicated that this was the case and 
lends quantitative support to Brodwin and 
Bourgeois' prescriptive model. 
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Hypothesis 3 
The study findings indicated that agreement with 
the CEO on strategic priorities was related to 
management level. Higher levels of management are in 
stronger agreement with the CEO on strategic priorities 
than middle management. Hambrick (1981) also found that 
agreement with the CEO on the organization's strategy 
was greater at higher levels of management. Hambrick 
measured "agreement with the CEO" similar to this study. 
However, the content of strategic agreement differed. 
Hambrick used descriptions of strategy that were related 
to strategies such as prospector and analyzer. This 
study measured "agreement with the CEO" based on 
strategic priorities which included a rank ordering and 
weighting of the priorities. This study attempted to 
measure a more complex understanding of the priorities. 
The results of the study were very similar to 
Hambrick's. There were higher levels of agreement with 
the CEO at higher levels of management. What was 
surprising was that in this study as well as Hambrick's 
a rather low level of strategic awareness may exist even 
among key managers. 
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Hypothesis 4 
It appears from the results of this study that 
there is no solid link between perceived involvement in 
the strategic process and the level of shared 
understanding. Levels of perceived involvement were not 
related to levels of shared understanding. The 
incremental model relied on coalition formation outside 
the CEO. It was conjectured from this model that 
involvement in the coalition formation in segments 
of management other than at the top level would lead to 
an ''agreement” on priorities that was shared by members 
of the coalition. As the strategy sponsored by the 
coalition gained strength more of management would share 
in the "understanding” of the priorities of the 
coalition. There would be increased understanding when 
there were increased levels of involvement and the 
levels of involvement would be closely related to 
perceived levels of involvement. 
Two difficulties arose when interpreting these 
results. First, perceived levels of involvement may not 
be closely enough related to actual involvement to have 
this hypothesis hold true. This may be particularly so 
for coalitions. Individuals other than the coalition may 
perceive themselves to be more involved in the strategic 
process than they are and their understanding of the 
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strategic priorities could differ greatly from the 
Another difficulty arises if there are two 
competing coalitions having Quite different priorities. 
The measure as it is designed would yield a third 
"shared understanding" that is held neither by the two 
coalitions nor the CEO. This makeshift "shared 
understanding" should be unrelated to the other two. 
It would appear that different research methods are 
needed to discover and measure the process and 
priorities of coalitions within organizations than 
those used in this study. 
Hypothesis 5 
Commitment to strategic priorities was found to be 
statistically the same for both levels of management. 
This finding in conjunction with the research that 
indicated that commitment enhances implementation 
(Hrebiniak and Snow, 1982; Tjosvold and Field, 1983) 
might indicate that middle management's commitment is 
not a hindrance to implementation. However, if middle 
management's commitment is a hindrance to implementation 
then top management's commitment might also be 
considered a hindrance. Commitment measures were fairly 
high for both levels of management, however. 
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What is of particular importance is that the study 
did not measure commitment to the organization in 
general, which may have included too much trust in past 
policies and procedures, but tried to measure commitment 
to the organization's strategic priorities. These 
strategic priorities may differ from long standing 
organizational policies. Therefore, if the effort which 
similar commitment can bring about is similar in both 
levels of management, inability to achieve particular 
strategies may be more related to the direction of that 
effort or to other factors not considered or in the 
control of management. More research needs to be done 
to discover whether there is difficulty with the 
direction of the effort. This is strongly indicated 
since this study and Hambrick's study both found 
considerable disagreement with the CEO even at key 
levels in the organization. 
Hypothesis 6 
When middle management perceives the environment to 
be complex, there is a positive relationship between 
perceived involvement and commitment. This relationship 
did not exist when middle management perceived the 
environment to be relatively simple. 
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Complexity may be affecting a number of factors 
relating to the level of commitment. Factors such as 
political access, belief in the soundness of the 
decision and ability to see the connection that 
decisions have to a personal goal (Guth and MacMillan, 
1986; Cook and Wall, 1980; Buchanan, 1975; Mohrman, 
1979) have all been shown to enhance commitment. 
Further research is needed to show whether complexity 
affects these factors and how these factors affect 
middle management's job needs. More specifically, 
further research needs to be done to show how 
Participation in the strategic process under complex 
environmental conditions affects those factors shown to 
be important for increased commitment. Research 
investigating the need of middle management to see a 
connection to their personal goals should focus on the 
most likely important personal goal of successful job 
performance. Organizational emphasis could then be 
placed on trying to provide what is needed for the 
individual to be successful within their particular job. 
Hypothesis 7 
The findings did not indicate that agreement with 
the CEO on strategic priorities was related to the stage 
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of the strategic process. Agreement with the CEO on 
strategic priorities was essentially the same at early 
and late stages of the strategic process. Under the 
rational model of the strategic process, in the early 
stage few individuals are aware of the strategy. As the 
strategy is put into place through activities such as 
highly developed plans, more agreement would be achieved 
later in the process as the rationale and the specifics 
of the plan became known through the other layers of 
management. Under the incremental model there would be 
an increase in agreement in later stages as top 
management increased support for the strategy of a 
particular coalition. Both models indicate that 
agreement should be increasing at later stages of the 
strategic process. These indications conflict with the 
findings of this study. This could indicate that a 
certain level of "disagreement" is a functional part of 
the entire strategic process and should be accepted as 
normal. The disagreement might then be managed rather 
than eliminated. 
The assumption of disagreement as normal and 
being functional throughout the strategic process may be 
especially important in a dynamic business environment. 
Under a dynamic environment disagreement may act as a 
buffer for the organization providing flexibility in 
priorities and strategies not possible under complete 
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agrGGin©nt. RGturning to thG intGraction modGl of figur© 
2 within th© lit©ratur© r©vi©w, rath©r than assum© that 
low commitmGnt-low und©rstanding, low cominitin©nt-high 
undGrstanding, and high commitm©nt-low und©rstanding 
w©r© all in©ff©ctiv© agr©©in©nt, th© assumption could b© 
mad© that th©s© could all b© ©ff©ctiv© disagr©©m©nt in a 
dynamic environment. Under this assumption low 
commitment-low understanding may appear as coalition 
formation. Low commitment-high understanding may appear 
as openness to change. High commitment-low 
understanding may appear as search activities. This 
would leave the organization with clusters of 
individuals that could shift their efforts to new 
strategic directions as they are needed within the 
changing environment. 
Implications and Conclusions 
Benefits to the Field of Strategic Management 
This study presents evidence that strategic 
consensus, content, (what is agreed on), scope (who 
is included) and degree (level of understanding and 
commitment) are affected by management's perceptions of 
the environment. Therefore, these dimensions need to be 
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considered in future research linking consensus to 
strategic performance. 
Further# the findings suggest the need for studies 
in the area of how management's environmental 
perceptions are formed. 
The study used a combination of qualitative and 
quantitative methods. The quantitative data provided a 
picture of the relationships that could then be related 
to specific qualitative descriptions within the 
organizations. This technique allows for a richer study 
at the organization level. It also makes maximum use of 
research sites with minimum additional costs of time and 
expense in data collection. 
Benefits to the Corporate Executive 
Of interest to the corporate executive is the 
finding within the qualitative analysis that 
"disagreement" is more "normal" than "agreement" on 
strategic priorities. Rather than attempting to achieve 
high levels of agreement executives may need to focus on 
effective levels of disagreement. 
Another point of interest that came out of the 
qualitative analysis of the study is that perception of 
involvement of the manager in the strategic process may 
not be related to the actual level of involvement. 
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Perception of involvement may be affected by the 
expected level of involvement. Hierarchical position 
influences the level of expected involvement. If the 
level of involvement in the strategic process is lower 
than what is appropriate for the hierarchical position, 
perceived level of involvement may plunge below 
individuals lower in the hierarchy. Further, raising 
expectations of higher levels of involvement that can't 
be met may create negative consequences. If the 
expected level of involvement in the strategic process 
is not met, perceived involvement may drop lower than 
the level existing previous to the change. Therefore, 
care must be taken when embarking on changes in the 
participation level within the organization. 
Limitations and Recommendations for Future Research 
Several future areas of research may arise from the 
following limitations. While the sample number was over 
250, and the response rate was over 90%, the study 
cannot be viewed as representative because only 17 
organizations were included in the study. Therefore, 
this cannot be construed as a typical unbiased response 
of the general business population. 
Ill 
Organizations were limited in industry settings and 
in size. Management preference for decision making 
techniques may be related to the industry setting. In 
one organization management preference was the primary 
driving force for the selection of a particular decision 
making style. Organizations studied were small to medium 
in size. Many organizations in the mature industries 
studied were smaller than the banks included in the 
study. Discussion with managers in these settings 
seemed to show no hierarchical structure, and these 
organizations had only one or two individuals in 
'management'. In these settings agreement with the CEO 
and shared understanding have little meaning. Decision 
making was very individualized though it was affected by 
the opinions of others. 
An interview was conducted and a study attempted in 
a larger size organization of the conglomerate type. The 
physical location of the managers hindered the 
acquisition of data for the study. Of the top management 
team, only the CEO and his chief financial officer were 
located at the home office. The remainder of the top 
management team were located throughout the country. The 
dynamics of decision making, agreement and shared 
understanding might be very different under these 
circumstances. These managers were brought together only 
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two to three times a year and may have little effect on 
each other's views. 
Further, though portions of the survey used well- 
tested and documented instruments, these instruments 
were modified and additional instrumentation was used to 
measure several variables. Therefore, it is difficult to 
know whether respondents find different meanings in the 
same question. 
The interviews explored the variables of interest 
in a more general way and though the interviews 
substantiated some of the proposed hypotheses, the 
interviews also suggested new directions for building 
hypotheses. 
The study suggested that top management will seek 
more information from the remainder of the organization 
if they perceive a dynamic environment. The interviews 
suggested that some top managements were also interested 
in seeking out new information from their external 
environment but no consistent pattern of seeking this 
information was found. Are some techniques more 
effective in seeking the information? Does the 
environment also affect which techniques may be 
effective in seeking the information? 
The study suggested that perceived involvement was 
important in the strategic process outcome of 
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commitment. The interviews and data suggested that 
perceived involvement may be related to the expected 
level of involvement. 
Theory suggested that agreement was important to 
the strategic process. The study suggested that 
disagreement was important to the process as well. 
Though an attempt was made to obtain as disparate a 
sample as possible along the dynamic dimension, the 
actual measurement of perceived dynamism showed a narrow 
range for the sample organizations. When interviewing 
the CEOs of the mature manufacturing industries where 
stability was expected, it became apparent that rather 
than dealing with stable environments these 
organizations were in dynamic environments. Under a 
stable environment there is a high likelihood of 
identifying the critical information because of little 
change in the environment over a period of time. 
However, the organizational situations had changed 
considerably in the past three years due to mergers, 
acquisitions and other restructuring of their 
competitors, suppliers and retailers. In addition, some 
of the firms themselves had experienced some form of 
restructuring within the past three years. This 
restructuring continues in these industries. 
Banking was predicted to have a dynamic 
environment. Interviews with the banking CEOs showed 
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that they too were dealing with restructuring in their 
industry. While seeking potential sites for the study 
in banking, several bank presidents that wanted to 
P^^^ticipate in the study were unable to do so because of 
recent mergers or acquisitions. Others would delay 
speaking to the researcher because current merger 
negotiations were ongoing. 
All of the restructurings would decrease the 
likelihood of obtaining information needed for dealing 
with competitors and the markets of the organization 
because historical knowledge of organizations becomes 
irrelevant. The organizations of the past no longer 
exist in the form they once did. It would seem that the 
recent proliferation of mergers and acquisitions across 
most industries has created a general business 
environment that is dynamic for most organizations. 
Therefore, dynamism versus stability may no longer be a 
viable way of looking at the business environment. There 
may be just varying degrees of dynamism. Further, if 
there is that great a difference in the business 
environment over their most current history for many 
firms, studying previous strategic procedures may not 
add appropriate knowledge of the strategic process. 
Shared understanding did not seem related to the 
factors measured in the study. Because understanding 
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in this study demanded a complex understanding of 
priorities by requiring both ranking and weighting of 
several priorities, the ability of the individual 
respondents of the study may have limited the level of 
understanding that could be obtained. 
This study does not allege that agreement with the 
CEO on priorities or even a shared understanding is a 
necessary state to be sought for strategic success. 
This aspect of the strategic process was not considered 
during this study. Further, agreement with the CEO 
differed from understanding the situation. Under 
agreement the CEO must impart his/her own perception of 
the priorities in order for the match to be comparable. 
This relies not only on the ability of the individual to 
understand the situation but the ability and the desire 
of the CEO to develop this understanding in others. 
Therefore, further research needs to be done to 
understand how learning and communication theories are 
present in the strategic process and how management 
preference affects that process. 
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EXHIBIT 1 
To: Responding manager 
From: General manager/CEO 
Subject: University of Massachusetts Research Project 
Date: 
Our firm has been asked to participate in a 
research project on managerial decision making being 
conducted by the School of Management at the University 
of Massachusetts. As part of this research, I would 
appreciate your taking the time to complete the attached 
survey. Please bear in mind that there are no right or 
wrong answers. Instead, the researchers are interested 
in your perceptions. Your responses will be completely 
confidential. Your survey cannot be identified in any 
way. 
When completing the survey, please respond to the 
best of your knowledge. In the event you are unable to 
respond to a particular item simply leave it blank. The 
survey takes about fifteen (15) minutes to complete. 
After completing the survey, please mail it no 
later than (date) directly to the University. A 
return envelope is provided for this purpose. I 
appreciate your participation in what I feel is an 
important project. 
EXHIBIT 2 
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strathjIc process questionnaire 
UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
Department of Management 
Management atrategy can play a vital role in determining the overall auccaaa 
of a buaineaa* the financial aervicea induatry ia no axception. Thia aurvey 
ia daaigned to acquire a more coi^leta underatanding of the atrategic proceaa 
aa it takea place within the financial aervicea induatry. It ia our hope 
that through thia atudy wa will be able to ultimately help manogeoient employed 
In thia important industry to develop a more complete understanding of the 
management process* It is our belief that such an increased awareness will ulti¬ 
mately result in a- stronger and healthier business* 
The survey should take 10 to 1$ aiinutes to complete* There are no right or 
wrong answers* four response will be held in strict confidence and will be 
reported only in aggregate form combined with information from other respon¬ 
dents* If you are interested in obtaining a copy of the research reaults* 
please fill in your name and address in the space provided* Thank you for 
your participation in this important study* 
When responding to this questionnaire please refer to the following: 
Strategy is a pattern of actions designed to get the organization where it 
wants to go* Strategic practices vary with each organization* Strategies may 
hs openly stated by management* may be deduced from management aotions*, or may 
evolved gradually over time* 
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PI**** Indieats th* atatSMst that Boat 
laft of tha atataaant. cloaaly daaerlbaa your bank by chackin* tha blank apaca to tha 
Stratagiaa ara davalopad at tha 
organ!tation ia dlraetad to put 
top ualng eritarla and formal tachniquaa, 
tha atratagy into affaet. 
Than tha 
• combination of tha diffarant pointa of rlaa brought forth by 
managara and profaaaionala on wfaataTor atratagie problam ia baing conaidaMd, ^ 
kay 
P** guidad by a miaaion «diich incorporataa tha CTO 
hia/har own work actialtiaa with tha miaaion in mind. 
'a vlaioB« Sach indialdual daaigna 
Strataglaa ara brought to tha top managamant from othar laaala. 
tha propoaala. Top managamant araluataa 
Othar 
5. raaaaa r^ ^ ^ bank'a atratagie prlorltiaa ara aatabliahad from •Hapar managamant 
iaauaa ordarm" to "uaunlly by group action". Plaaaa cirela tha moat approprlata ra^nla!^^ 
Sppar managamant 
iaauaa ordara 
1 2 
Ordarsi 
coBanta inritad 
3 4 5 
Aftar dlaeuaaion. 
ordarm 
6 7 
Daually by 
group action 
8 9 
Plaaaa rata t^ following atatamants from "not at all iarolaad" to "fully inaolTad" according to tha way 
tra“J procaaa. Plaaaa circla tha moat apprcpriaS raaponaT^ 
I • inrolvad in Identifying problaaa ■"«< 
propoaing objactiraa that clarify tha naada and 
opportunitiaa put forth to ua. 
fully 
inTolrad 
1 2 
aodarataly 
3 4 5 
not at all 
InvolTad 
6 7 
7. I aa imrolTad with daaaloping ona or more optlona 
that daal with obtaining organisational objactiaaa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
8* I am inrolaad in daaaloping dataila for optlona 
daralopad for obtainirg organisational ob>etiTaa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
9» I am inTolaad in aaaaaaing tha aarlta of rarioua 
altamatiTaa daaalopad for obtaining organisational 
objactiaaa. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
^ iwolaad in ayplyiag rewards and ineantlTas, 
paraonnal aalaetloB* pr«motioa« rasourea allocation, 
and saaetioas to put changes into place. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Plaaaa iadleatm below any othar you aaa youraalf inrolaad in tha atratagie prooaaai 
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S1ms« Hat la tha apaea balow tha atratagie priority Mbich you faal ia currantly of primary eoacam in 
your bankt 
Plaaaa rata tha foUowiag atataaaata from "atrongly diaagraa" to "atrongly agraa" aa thay partala to tha 
atratagie priority you juat liatad* Plaaaa eircla tha aoat approprlata raaposaa for aaeh atataaaat. 
atroagly 
diaagcaa 
I aa wlUiag to put a great deal of effort beyond 
that aoraally axpaetad ia order to help thia 
atratagie priority eoaa to raalization* 1 2 
12. Z talk up thia atratagie priority to ay ooUaaguaa 
aa a great thing to work for* 1 2 
1}* L would aeoapt alaoat aay type of job aaal gnaent 
ia order to keep working toward. 
thia atratagie priority* 1 2 
1^* I find that ay pxioritiaa and tha organization'a 
atratagie prlorltiea era wary aiailar* 1 2 
15* X aa proud to tall othera that 1 aa working toward 
thia atratagie priority* 1 2 
16» Thia atratagie priority raadly in^iraa tha beat ia 
aa in the way of job perforaaaee* 1 2 
17* Z m eztraaely glad Z ehoae thia priority to work 
for oTer othara Z hacre eonaiderad ia tha reeaat paat* 1 2 
l8* L really eare about the fate of thia organization 
and baliara that thia atratagie priority will go 
a long way in thia organization*a perfozwance* 1 2 
19* for Be« thia ia the beat of all prioritiea for 
whioh to work* 
atrongly 
neutral agree 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
34567 
low would you daacribe the buaineoa anTironaant ia which your bank oo^ataa t flaaaa oirela your ehoieaa* 
OOB BTTgZW— BVZBOKKBn ZA • • 
Very liable 
faiy lartaia 
Very fViaadly 
Very llaple 
Vary VaTorable 
Very Predietable 
CooparatiTe 
Opportunity Poor 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
12345 
6 7 Very Oynaaio 
6 7 Vary Uncertain 
^ 7 Vary Unfriendly 
6 7 Very Coeplez 
6 7 Very Unfaworabla 
6 7 Very Oi^radictable 
6 7 Vary Coapatitira 
6 7 Opportunity Rich 
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20. ?aMd on thoir rolotlv* loportaac* to tho auccoaa of thia bank allocata up to, but not aora than, 
10 pointa to tha aat of fiva atatasanta balow. For axaapla, you oiigbt allocata pointa to tha 
atataaanta aa followai 
A.7 A-2 km^ 
B-0 B-a B-2 
(T-O CiC CaO 
Ib2 D-A 
E«1 
TTo ^10 
Tha long run aueeaaa of thia bank dapanda ont 
A> tha daralopnant of naa produeta and aarrlcaa. 
B« organisational coordination and control. 
C. tha daTalopaant of afficiant oparating procaduxaa and eapabilitiaa. 
D. tha daralopaant of a coaaittad and aotiaatad workforca. 
g. tha daaalopaant of a hi^ quality cuatoaar baaa. 
21. Plaaaa rank tha following prioritiaa in iaqportanea to tha long run aueeaaa of thia bank. Uaa mabara 
1 throu^ 5 aaaigning tha top priority a 1 and tha laaat priority a 5. For azaapla, you night rank 
tha atataaanta aa foUoMt 
k, Tha daralopnant of new produeta and aarrlcaa. 
Organisational coordination and control. 
C. Tha daralopnant of afficiant oparating procaduraa and eapabilitiaa. 
D. Tha daralopnant of a coanittod and notiratad workforce. 
B. Tha daralopnant of a high quality cuatonar baaa. 
22, What ia your area of raaponaibilityt (a.g. aeeounting/financa, narkating, c^rationa, cuatonar 
aarrica) 
Thank you for your tlna and effort in canplating thia quaationnaira. Plaaaa faal free to naka any 
additional eonnaata that you baliara nay help our raaaarch. If you would like infomation on tha raoulta 
of our raaaarch, plaaaa avgiply your nana and addraaa in tha area proridad below* 
(eonplata only for a copy of our raaaarch reaulta) 
Addraaa 
EXHIBIT 3 
LETTER OF INTRODUCTION 
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UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS Department of Management 
AT AMHERST 
School of Management 
Amherst. MA 01003 
(413) 549-4930 
Sep. 8, 1987 
Mr. Robert H. McColl 
Athol Savings Bank 
Box M 
Athol, MA 01331 
Dear Mr. McColl: 
The purpose of this letter is to introduce ourselves and to ask 
for your help. As members of the business school we are involved 
* research project that is investigating the various ways 
companies reach agreement on strategic priorities. Due to the 
multiple changes in banking regulations in the recent past we 
have decided to study the banking industry within this area. It 
is important, therefore, that Athol Savings Bank be represented in 
our study. 
Because it is difficult to go into the details of the study in a 
letter, we would like to meet with you, at your convenience, to 
discuss our project and your company's potential participation in 
it. Let us assure you that all we are asking for is a little of 
time and that any research results would be reported in 
aggregate form, would not identify your bank, and would not be 
reported without your prior approval. 
As a president of a bank we are sure you appreciate the difficulty 
in achieving agreement on priorities. Your participation in this 
study may provide new insights into this challenge. In exchange 
you may gain new insights into your own organization. We will 
call you next week for your reaction. In the meantime if you have 
any questions or comments please feel free to call us at (413) 
549—4930. Thank you, we look forward to meeting with you. 
The University of Massachusetts is an Affirmative Action/Equal Opportunity Institution 
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ORGANIZATION PROFILES 
The following are summaries of the interviews with 
the individual CEOs of the banks and manufacturing firms 
included in the studies. Each summary contains three 
parts. The first part covers unique aspects of the 
organization's setting and history. The second part 
contains a description of the organization's strategic 
decision making process and the third part contains a 
description of the organization's information process. 
Bank: A 
This bank is the result of the friendly merger of 
two small mutual savings banks that served similar 
neighboring communities. Both banks were financially 
sound at the time of the merger. The five top executives 
involved in the merger remained with the bank initially 
but are now retired. Though this was a friendly merger, 
the decisio-n making styles of the two banks were quite 
different: one was "unilateral" and the other was "more 
democratic". 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
Building on the management value of "quality rather 
than quantity," the current strategic direction is to 
fill a niche left open by a local commercial bank that 
merged with a large regional bank. Bank A felt they 
could offer quicker and more personal service to local 
businesses for commercial loans than could be offered at 
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the large regional bank. Though Bank A did not have the 
commercial lending knowledge, they sought out a 
knowledgeable person in this area to head up the new 
strategic direction. This individual was brought into 
the organization, then the rest of the staff to support 
this direction was placed. Finally, projected figures 
for the new direction were decided. 
Information Process: 
Within the bank information is transmitted to the 
two top levels through informal meetings and one on one 
meetings with the president. 
Bank: B 
This mutual savings bank is the only unionized bank in 
its immediate region. Their unique and frequent 
advertising style includes the president of the bank in 
commercials encouraging individuals to obtain loans from 
the bank. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The key strategic decision was made based on a long 
employee strike of several years ago. The union contract 
is negotiated every three years and keeps labor costs 
very high in comparison to other banking institutions in 
the area. This has eliminated the strategic possibility 
of generating money off of fees from new mortgages due 
to the high labor costs of instituting a mortgage. In 
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order to control for all other costs in relation to the 
union contract, the bank matched the costs of the type 
of mortgage issued to mortgage income. Their selection 
was a three year renewable, variable mortgage. Valuing 
high quality loans, each variable mortgage customer must 
qualify at the highest possible rate of their mortgage 
contract. Beyond reviewing and controlling the rate 
structure, cost control in all areas is essential to 
their strategic direction. 
The other strategic concern deals with increasing 
visibility and customer access. 
Information Process: 
Because of the high fixed personnel costs due to 
t 
union labor contracts, the bank compares actual costs to 
predicted costs based on the three year labor contract. 
The president meets with his staff of department heads 
and especially mortgage heads every Tuesday morning. 
Everyone below this is unionized and is, therefore, 
excluded from these meetings. After a general 
discussion of the rates, each individual is asked to 
discuss what is happening in their own area. Rates and 
cost cutting measures are set at this meeting. 
Bank: C 
Historically this bank was a chartered, mutual 
savings bank begun in the mid 1800's. It was small for a 
long period of time and became somewhat larger in the 
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mid 1970's by merging with another small, mutual savings 
bank and changing its name. In the late 1970's a third 
small mutual savings bank merged with this combined 
bank. The bank went public in 1986. At the time of the 
interview, the purchase of six branches from a large 
regional bank had just occurred. The current president 
has been with the original bank for the past 36 years 
and has been president of the bank for the past sixteen 
and a half years. 
Strategic Decision Masking Process: 
The president was very enthusiastic about the 
growth in size of the bank, peppering his conversation 
with various size rankings of the bank over the last few 
years. When making the major strategic decisions the 
president primarily considered what was "best for the 
bank"—"best for the shareholders". His primary concern 
is whether new growth in an area is sustainable. 
Strategic decisions are made quickly based on 
opportunities that arise and on problems that occur. 
The major decisions that have had the most affect on the 
strategy of the bank came about with little or no 
previous planning. As an example, the current purchase 
of several branches of a large regional bank enhanced 
already existing strategic direction and gave the bank 
an additional direction. One branch is located in a 
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growing area and will increase the number of mortgages 
substantially. A second is next door to one of their own 
offices and will help control competition. Further, by 
acquiring the branches, the bank acquired the expertise 
and space for commercial lending. 
Information Process: 
Information about opportunities comes to the 
president directly through his peer contacts. Detailed 
research on a particular opportunity is done by outside 
consultants such as lawyers. Most of the information for 
running the bank seems to be in the head of the 
president. He has great command of the financial figures 
of the bank and comparative performance figures of his 
bank. 
Information about a decision is communicated 
downward by the president himself. Meeting personally 
with department heads, speaking at impromptu meetings of 
employees and answering all questions seems to be the 
president's preferred style of communication. In 
addition, memos keep managers informed between meetings. 
Bank: D 
This is a small mutual savings bank that in the 
recent past lost its president of 10 years to a sudden 
heart attack. The current president was the then 
treasurer and best friend of the president. The death 
has left a definite vacancy in the bank with the new 
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president trying to fill the two roles of president and 
treasurer. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The board has been separated into six different 
committees: auditing, nominating, personnel, marketing, 
planning, facilities (the last four are especially 
active). Committees on the board are carefully selected 
to fill the needs of the committee. Much of this is 
decided by the type of work the individuals do. For 
example, two contractors are on the facilities 
committee. These committees get involved in such 
decisions as what property to actually buy and which 
projects should be backed by mortgages. 
In addition to having the board concern itself with 
the active running of the bank, the president was very 
concerned himself with giving the customer "Good 
service, excellent service." The president concerns 
himself with minute detail in this area. 
Information Process: 
The president seeks out information concerning the 
community and its needs through the local individuals 
active on the board of directors. In addition, detailed 
bank financial data are kept. 
Most of the committees meet rather frequently. The 
Loan Committee (lending officers and president) meets 
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every Monday. Every Tuesday the board meets with the 
president. On Wednesday all the management and top non¬ 
officers meet with the president. Additionally, the 
board committees meet with the president as needed. At 
each of the meetings projects and ideas are thoroughly 
discussed. 
Bank: E 
This mutual savings bank was founded by a 
manufacturer in the 1800's. He had been keeping his 
workers' money in a desk drawer and wanted to put the 
money to work earning money for the workers. 
Traditionally the clientele has been blue-collar but now 
the area has a high concentration in high technology 
manufacturing and has become a bedroom community for 
this type of employee. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The president is involved in the making of all major and 
many minor decisions. Even bank surveillance is 
monitored in his office. The president meets with 
directors on a regular basis. Decision making revolves 
around pricing. The president considers pricing to be a 
three tier situation: over-priced, meet the price, and 
mid-way. The organization tries to set prices to bring 
in a certain volume of growth while maintaining 
"extremely good" asset quality. Once prices are set 
decisions about servicing growth are decided. In 
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particular, they were currently building a special 
addition to the bank building to service their enormous 
growth in the mortgage retail area. 
In the strategic decision making and in other 
decision making the management seems to be very 
conscious of long time depositors and the historical 
roots of the organization. The president will chat with 
long time customers when they come in to do business and 
the president personally keeps in touch with account # 1 
to influence the owner of the account to keep it open 
(this account has been continually open since 1851). 
Restoration of the building has kept the historical 
roots intact and enhanced the old time identity of the 
bank. 
Information Process: 
Data seems to be readily available on computer 
information set-ups. They are in the process of putting 
in a high speed computer network to allow for more 
access to banking information. The bank seeks 
information on pricing and financial status of 
competitive banks in their market. The president keeps 
updated data on the building of new development homes 
within their marketing area. There is little land left 
in the home base city of the bank. Therefore, the bank 
develops contacts with Realtors and builders in outlying 
134 
areas. This is especially important since they see 
themselves as a retail mortgage bank. 
Staff meetings are held on a regular basis but the 
president is easily available to management on a regular 
basis. Management staff is divided into four levels. A 
sixty page detailed business plan is available to the 
top management team and each manager down to the branch 
managers is sent a list of priority objectives for the 
year. 
Bank: F 
Founded in the mid 1800's this is a state chartered 
traditional mutual bank that provides traditional 
services. They were purely retail--that is providing 
primarily mortgages and passbook accounts. They were 
operated very conservatively, very prudently and very 
tightly building up a surplus in the range of 15%. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
Twelve to fifteen of the top management of the bank 
travel to a retreat once a year to create a long range 
plan. At another retreat, this plan is fleshed out. 
Then various task forces made up of representatives of 
individuals that are directly affected by the changes 
determine implementation plans for the various areas. 
For example, the senior vice president set up a task 
force on how to reach a consensus on what customer 
contacts should be like. The task force was composed of 
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personnel people, retail banking individuals and was 
mostly at a non-officer level. 
Senior management meets once a week on Mondays to 
discuss the bank's strategy. These individuals 
concentrate on the future directions of the bank. The 
president feels that at this point in the strategy you 
have to "create as you go along." He feels that having a 
specific goal written down means "you will probably be 
making a mistake as much as you are doing the right 
thing." 
Initially decisions were made to bring the asset 
portfolio up to par. Once this had been accomplished, 
the planning team set out to decide on a particular 
strategy. The new direction consisted of capitalizing on 
their historical conservative values. Then a structure 
with appropriate individuals was designed to capitalize 
on the new directions. 
Information Process: 
Within the past five years the bank has 
concentrated on doing careful surveys and research on 
all of the opportunities and risks open to the bank. The 
bank sought out "everything you can think of". 
Bank: G 
This bank is the result of a friendly merger of 
five years ago that "worked on a handshake". The 
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presidents put the banks together and "cut a hole in the 
wall” to join them. Both banks were short of personnel 
so that no one lost their jobs and they were able to 
hire extra personnel. The boards were merged and spots 
were found for everyone. The bank is "not just the 
bottom line but part of a living community bank”. That 
community includes competition from some 30 odd credit 
unions that "don't even check credit ratings”. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The bank's current strategic concern seems to be 
with its community image. They want their branches to be 
seen as a "neighborhood” banks. Beyond that they want 
these "neighborhood banks” to have a very professional 
image along with community involvement. Specific 
implementation of the neighborhood image is decided 
within each branch and is implemented separately. For 
example, the downtown branch had "chocolate days” during 
the Christmas promotion and had someone come in and make 
chocolate at that branch. This idea came from the 
branch, was approved of by the head office, and was 
planned and implemented within this particular branch. 
However, the projection of a professional image was 
decided at the chief executive level and decisions about 
implementation of this are also done at this level. For 
example, the president decided to require all branch 
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managers to read the Wall Street Journal daily as part 
of their continuing development. 
Information process: 
The bank president prefers discussing things on an 
individual basis and does not like to meet in groups. 
No regular meetings are scheduled. The president feels 
this works well because there seems to be no hesitancy 
in communication in this format and no personal attacks 
of another. 
Bank: H 
This mutual savings bank appears to be run "by the 
book" with that book being an informed, up to date 
management textbook. There is both emphasis on specific 
goals and complete development of those goals as well as 
emphasis on team effort. There is concern for individual 
employee development and an awareness of the 
difficulties of overcoming traditional male biases 
against females in upper management positions. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The planning committee sets the three to five year 
plan. The top management team (five people—the 
president, the senior vice president, and three vice 
presidents) make the decisions on the one year plan. 
This management team translates the plan into its 
ramifications for each of the decision areas. Each 
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department head is then responsible for translating 
these orders into individual decisions for their unique 
area. All of the different decisions are based on 
setting and meeting growth, earnings, surplus, deposit, 
and cost of money targets. 
Information Process: 
As part of the construction of the business plan, 
the top management team analyzed the bank's strengths 
and weaknesses, type of environment in which it operates 
and its past history and experience. Included in the 
analysis was an employee survey. All of this information 
is compared to the fiscal strength of the bank. Most of 
the information seems to be transmitted downward through 
"marching orders" developed by the management team for 
the different decision areas. Information going upward 
is filtered as it passes through the chain of command. 
The senior management team is extremely cohesive and is 
involved directly with each other on a day to day basis. 
Bank: I 
Located in a once thriving industrial city area 
that is now being revitalized, this bank is managed 
through a team of three individuals. All three discuss 
and voice their agreement or disagreement with the 
professional information they receive. The two 
individuals just beneath the president have a strong 
influence over major decisions but the final decision 
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rests with the president. The atmosphere is very 
informal even to the point of having a candy jar on the 
conference table that the trio meets at. They tease and 
joke comfortably with each other and can be serious as 
the need arises. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
A formal business plan is put together in two and a 
half weeks every year. From this policy is set. However, 
the management team feels the real decision making 
occurs when they sit down together on an informal basis 
and use the business plan and all of the research that 
goes with it as a jumping off point for the start of 
discussions. The formal plan is reviewed throughout the 
year on a regular basis. Plans and goals are adjusted 
according to the changes in the circumstances and the 
discrepancies between the plan and actuality. 
Different ways to earn money are primarily 
considered. Once a decision has been made its 
ramifications at lower levels are considered and further 
decisions made. Every decision is based on the effect 
on the bottom line. "If it doesn't make money, it's 
going to be opposed." 
Information Process: 
Management informs the lower levels what is to be 
accomplished. Then they take input from the lower 
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levels. Management uses this approach because they feel 
it allows for creativity and they don't want to tell 
people how best to do their jobs. 
Most of the information transfer seems to be done 
on an informal basis at ad hoc meetings. 
Bank: J 
This bank is a wholly owned subsidiary of a 
recently established bank holding company. The bank also 
holds a wholly owned mortgage bank subsidiary. The bank 
holding company has recently purchased a bank in a 
contiguous area. Historically the bank has been a state 
chartered mutual savings bank. It went public two years 
prior to the interview. The bank has a very strong 
management team drawn from natives of the local 
community who had gained commercial lending experience 
at local commercial banks that were acquired by larger 
regional banks. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The main strategic thrust has been decided on by 
the very highest individuals using the basic premise of 
"Grow to a point where it's too expensive to buy us. 
Their growth was of phenomenal proportions prior to and 
just after going public. They are now trying to balance 
this growth with concerns for profitability. In this 
market and industry the two goals of growth and 
profitability seem to be at odds with each other a great 
141 
deal of the time. They are now trying to balance their 
concerns over these two goals and decisions about 
services, policies, and new products. All must be tied 
to these two issues. All other decisions are made as 
concerns arise. These concerns are addressed after 
suggestions are made from managers at monthly or 
quarterly meetings. These meetings are open to 
suggestions for new products, services, and policy. 
Information Process: 
The bank uses professional feasibility studies and 
demographics for background information for decisions. 
Appropriate outside consultants, and former bank 
examiners are used to develop and maintain the quality 
of their commercial loan portfolio. In looking for a 
bank to purchase to achieve their goal of expansion 
across state lines, they "looked at just about 
everybody, but rarely reached the point of actually 
talking." 
Within the bank proper (not the holding company 
setting) most information is transmitted in monthly 
meetings with senior management and quarterly meetings 
with all levels of management. The technique in the 
senior management meetings is to go round the table with 
each person informing others of what is happening in 
their area and giving their ideas and concerns. Concerns 
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that arise at meetings are delegated to various 
participants of the meeting for study. The C.F.O. is 
trying to generate more reports so that decisions will 
revolve more around the bank's income statement. 
Firm: K 
This 100 year old firm is an infant clothes 
manufacturer with a name well-recognized for quality. It 
has its administrative offices in the North and its 
manufacturing plants in the South. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
Two levels of management including the president, 
top marketing people, top finance people and top 
administrative people (approximately 8 individuals) 
attend the top management meeting approximately every 
four weeks. Based on current information, actions are 
decided right at that meeting unless there is a 
conflict. If so, the outside consultant reports back 
with information and recommendations at another meeting. 
In all decisions, the president has the final say. 
Individuals running the profit centers are responsible 
for the performance of that profit center. 
Initially, the firm decided on market niches it 
wanted to reach and then developed a structure to take 
advantage of the strengths of the larger parent 
organization as well as meet the needs of reaching the 
particular market niches selected. 
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Information Process: 
The company is very market aware. Consumer studies 
are done on a continuous basis. To be as objective as 
possible, outside consultants are used for obtaining 
information if there seems to be any conflict of 
opinion. A top accounting firm is present at top 
management meetings as outside consultants to advise and 
offer impartial opinions. The firm stays aware of 
government and political changes for their long run 
effect on the business. 
Firm: L 
The firm is a privately owned manufacturer of 
mattresses organized in 1900 by the grandfather of the 
current president. The grandfather was a part of the 
founding of the Young Presidents Organization that 
included many of the young entrepreneurs of the early 
part of this century. Many of the workers are second 
generation in the business as well. 
The industry is extremely cyclical and the work 
load is extremely difficult to balance because of the 
expense of storing and shipping such a large, awkward 
product. The family is extremely loyal to the workers. 
Even during an extremely slow month no one is laid off. 
Work was found for javeryone. The firm had just 
purchased an additional firm to extend the range that 
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their mattresses address to a high styled market. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
All of management gives input for decisions in 
their own area. Foremen have a say in decisions and even 
the janitor's opinion is sought out and generally taken 
about products and equipment he needs for various jobs. 
The strategic emphasis is on their unique hand-maid 
product. High quality materials and manufacturing are 
stressed. The firm is expanding the range of their 
mattresses to the high styled market, the institutional 
market, and the apartment dweller market. 
Information Process: 
Management takes pride in their early 
computerization of statistics for running their 
business. They track every piece of information to 
account for the cost of putting together any particular 
mattress. Every retail account is computerized. The 
president and his management team receive an end of the 
month report on month to date and year to date figures 
for each account. One hundred other statistics on 
service rendered to retailers is also available. 
The president walks through the factory frequently 
and keeps in touch with each individual working there. 
If things are difficult, the president will help out in 
any position. The president knows every operation in 
manufacturing and shipping from his work as a young boy 
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within the firm. Previously the president was in charge 
of the sales department and still trains new salesmen to 
train the retail sales people by standing next to them 
and having them watch as the president makes a typical 
sale in the retailer's establishment. 
Firm: M 
This paper conversion firm was begun in the 1920's 
on its current location. In the mid 30's this private 
firm was sold to a larger private firm. In the 60's the 
firm was sold to another firm and has remained a wholly 
owned subsidiary of this firm since. The industry is 
machinery specific with little moving around once the 
machinery has been purchased. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
The initial decision is on level of profitability, 
net positive cash flow and rate of growth. These are set 
by the parent firm. The upper levels of the management 
of the subdivision develop operating and capital budgets 
based on these goals. This takes up three months of the 
year. These are developed into a rolling three year 
plan. Action plans are then developed from the bottom up 
on an ongoing basis to try to achieve these specific 
goals. Though discussion of plans takes place in a 
committee setting, all decisions are made by the 
individual managers. However, all decisions must be 
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supported by facts and integrated with the three major 
goals of return on net assets, net positive cash flow 
and a specific rate of growth. The need to reach 
quarterly goals overides most considerations at bi¬ 
weekly meetings. The president feels his job is to 
maneuver the decision making process by removing 
constraints from the thinking of the individual 
managers, in particular, that the decisions are not made 
by committee. 
Information Process: 
Managers seek out information from vendors, and 
clients and the manufacturing situation. The management 
team meets every two weeks to discuss action plans. The 
meeting is run by the president with a formal agenda 
sent out prior to the meeting. Agenda items are often 
developed on a one on one basis with the president. 
Other items coming up from the meeting are researched by 
appropriate individuals (such as the department most 
affected by the discussion area) and brought back to 
another meeting for discussion. 
Firm: N 
The firm is a private shoe manufacturer started in 
the 1920's by two brothers. In the 50's the business was 
sold to an individual who put it in a trust fund for a 
large university. Subsequently, the university sold the 
firm to a private party. Two more buy-outs (the last one 
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in 1985) left the firm highly leveraged. The owners are 
strongly in favor of staying private because of the 
freedom of management. The organizational performance is 
heavily reliant on the performance of the overall 
economy and very sensitive to even small changes in the 
national and global economies. This leads to difficulty 
in predicting important future directions. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
In preparation for a drastic change in strategy, 
the president attended a six month program at Harvard 
dealing with global strategies. Upon his return, outside 
consultants were brought in to help define long range 
strategies. The entire organization was reviewed to 
discover ways to achieve the highest operating profit. 
Their original marketing niche is a dwindling U.S. 
segment and development of new niches leads to "cheaper 
overseas knock-offs". To try to keep ahead, a wide range 
of decisions is being worked on at once ranging from 
possible plant closings, kinds of flyers to send sales 
representatives, capitalizing on a new innovative 
product, new marketing approaches, and slogans. Each 
area feeds off the decisions of other areas in 
serendipitous fashion. The firm's main strategic 
concerns are with price-point, comfort, quality, and 
value. 
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Information Process: 
An extremely detailed budget planning process is in 
place. The information permeates down through a very 
formalized budget process. The budget process is 
generally done by the month but in some instances is 
done by the week. The president is generally present 
within the organization headquarters and is available to 
meet with individuals according to the particular piece 
of strategy being worked on. All important positions are 
linked by computer systems. 
Firm: 0 
This private manufacturing paper supplies firm was 
organized about 100 years ago. It is just beginning to 
grow to a global organization and is now exporting to 
Japan. Management is very steeped in the tradition of 
their founder and their founder's love of Scotland and 
the thistle symbol. Just as the founder was a 
benefactor for local organizations such as Jr. 
Achievement , Boy Scouts, and 4-H, the firm continues to 
be concerned with the way the valley of their location 
is developing. They want to maintain the original beauty 
and still allow for development. The president believes 
this can only be done with careful planning and control 
based on research and education. 
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Strategic Decision Making Process: 
A very thorough long range plan is developed once a 
year. Everyone must buy into the three year plan once it 
is set for the year or "they don't stay in the 
organization." Though this holds true the president 
likes to hear from the maverick manager as well. All 
daily decisions are tied to the three year plan. 
Beyond the long range plan, each individual 
department head and manager must develop personal 
quantitative "challenges" that if accomplished will 
enhance the job he or she is doing. The "challenges" 
often deal with behaviors expressed in a quantitative 
way. To develop these the president meets on a somewhat 
regular basis with each department head and top manager. 
Information Process: 
Before making any plans there is a complete review 
of where the organization has been, where they are, and 
where they are going. Next a combination of external and 
internal research on problems and projects is done. The 
company reviews their advertising efforts at least once 
a year through meetings with groups of customers who 
make suggestions for areas of improvement. Beyond this 
the president visits similar factories both here and 
abroad to compare operations. He also seeks out 
information and opinions from his own department heads. 
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After the research is complete, the primary carrier 
of the information is the three year plan. This becomes 
a daily part of doing business and of communicating with 
each other. Meetings of all top management involving 16 
individuals are held once a month to compare results 
with planned direction. 
Firm: P 
The firm, the largest private sector employer in 
the area, is a publicly held corporation which 
manufactures upholstery fabrics for large furniture 
distributors. The organization has undergone a number 
of buy-outs and financial restructurings before going 
public. An additional firm was also purchased by the 
company in the recent past. Most recently the firm 
changed its name. 
The organization values honesty above all else. The 
firm encourages physical activity and participation in 
sports. The firm feels both are important to the overall 
well-being of the organization. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
For the past several years major decisions have 
revolved around buy-outs and financial restructures. 
These have allowed for an infusion of capital for the 
planned strategic changes. Because of this the next set 
of major decisions dealt with cost cutting and control 
measures. A sophisticated computerized inventory cost 
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control system was recently implemented. Next on the 
agenda is the restructuring of the organization with 
appropriate personnel changes. Finally, changes in the 
business mix will follow. 
Each new idea is tested for fit with already 
existing directions. If it passes this test, it is 
discussed to the point of "beating it to death." After 
passing the initial discussion, it is studied informally 
and analyzed internally. Finally, if the idea is still 
viable, outside consultants are generally brought in 
with appropriate expertise to explore the idea. 
Information Process: 
Once a month top management talk about strategic 
issues at an off-site meeting. This same top management 
formally discusses operating issues at weekly Tuesday 
meetings. Each individual discusses his/her area for 10 
to 15 minutes. Bluntness and directness are encouraged 
during these reports. Because of newly renovated office 
space the management has contact with each other daily. 
Firm: Q 
This firm, a medium sized manufacturer of specialty 
business forms, is privately held and managed by the 
original family that began the firm in the 1800's. 
Family members in the business prior to this president 
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agreed on little except the ability of the general 
manager. 
Displayed prominently in the waiting are of the 
firm's main plant is the story of the company which 
reads in part: 
Our search for, and investment in, quality is 
continual. We guarantee complete customer 
satisfaction, through business efficiency 
...resulting from the right system, with the 
right forms, delivered at the right time, at the 
right price. 
Though the company had become slow moving in responses, 
they are taking measures to put this company value back 
into practice. The company has instituted a suggestion 
system. There has been more open discussion with the 
union with the result that the union has agreed that 
productivity must be increased by 15%. 
Strategic Decision Making Process: 
Most of the current decisions have dealt with 
selecting a management team and increasing productivity 
by reducing cost and production time. Initially, the 
president, a family member, was brought in from another 
position in the family business. Next, the goals and 
objectives were decided. Now they are trying to match 
the rest of the management team to the goals and 
objectives. Based on these larger objectives, each 
manager writes out-his own goals and objectives. Top 
management goes over these individually with each 
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manager trying to get them as specific as possible. The 
president stated that the detail of these "Depends on 
the individual manager and how tightly you can pin them 
down." During the year, the general manager meets with 
the top six or seven of the management team once a week 
to discuss a pre-set agenda. 
Information Process; 
Concentrating on market orientation, the firm has 
been looking for a marketing niche but has been 
unsuccessful in this regard. To cut costs and increase 
productivity, the management has tried to develop open 
discussion with the employees and the union. The goals 
to be accomplished are stated in a weekly or bi-weekly 
basis by the general manager in a company newsletter he 
writes. Other issues and concerns are discussed as well. 
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PLOT MI-FIRM M 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
24+ 
+—+ 
+ 
a 
g 
r 
e 
e 
m 
e 
n 
t 
16+ 
8+ 
0+ 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
12 3 
management level 
Frequencies and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
168 
CEO AGREEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT LEVEL: FIRM N 
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SHARED UNDERSTANDING WITH PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT: BANK H 
PLOT H2-BANK H 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+—+ 
8.25-t' + 
5.5+ 
2.75+ 
* * 
+ 
+ 
0+ + 
++-+-+-+-+-^-^-^—+ 
1.25 3.75 6.25 8.75 
0 2.5 5 7.5 
involvement 
Frequencies and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - » 
3 - X 
4 - X 
«
Q
9
H
>
0
.a
p
tr
tC
Q
r
io
o
.g
c
 
173 
SHARED UNDERSTANDING WITH PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT: FIRM K 
PLOT K2-FIRM K 
+ 4—-- + - — + ----^—-4-4-4-4-4 
8,254 + 
5.5+ 4 
2.75+ 
0+ 
++ —-+-4.. 
1.25 3.75 
0 2.5 
.+-+-+-+. 
6.25 8.75 
5 7.5 
4 
•4 
involvement 
Frequencies and symbols 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
used 
iQ
P
H
-
Q
.0
O
tr
ta
^
1
(
D
O
.9
C
 
174 
SHARED UNDERSTANDING WITH PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT: 
PLOT 02-FIRM 0 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
8.25-t- 
5.5+ 
2.75+ 
0+ 
+^.-+-+-+-+-+-+ 
1.25 3.75 6.25 
0 2.5 5 7.5 
Involvement 
FreQuencles and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
FIRM O 
+—+ 
+ 
+ 
+ 
—+—+ 
.75 
175 
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0+ + 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+—+ 
% 
1 2. 3 
management level 
5.5-J- 
2.75-»- 
Frequencies and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
182 
PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT LEVEL: BANK E 
+ + 
8.25-i> 
PLOT E4-BANK E 
——4—-+ --+-^-^-^ 
4 
i 
n 
V 
o 
1 
V 
e 
m 
e 
n 
t 
5.5+ 
2.75+ 
0+ 4 
44-4-4-4-4-4-4-4-4 
management level 
Frequencies and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
183 
PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT LEVEL: FIRM N 
PLOT N4-FIRM N 
-+-^--► +-^-+ 
8.25-t- 
+ 
>► 
i 
n 
V 
o 
1 
V 
e 
m 
e 
n 
t 
5.5+ 
2.75+ 
* -► 
X 
. + 
0+ + 
--4.-+-+-+-+-+-+- 
1.2 3 
management level 
Frequencies and symbols used 
1 - . 
2 - ^ 
3 - X 
4 - X 
184 
PERCEIVED INVOLVEMENT WITH MANAGEMENT LEVEL: FIRM P 
i 
n 
V 
o 
1 
V 
e 
m 
e 
n 
t 
PLOT P4-FIRM P 
8 • 25'^ -f 
f) 
• • I 
• • I 
M I 
X . 
• X i 
* I 
2.75+ 
0+ + 
++-+-+-+-+-+-+-+—+ 
1 2. 3 
nanagement level 
Frequencies and synbols used 
1 - . 
2 - * 
3 - X 
4 - X 
APPENDIX D 
DATA SET 
186 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 {S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
A 
B 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
18 6 
20 5 
28 6 
29 6 
46 3 
2 2 
1 2 
1 1 
2 2 
2 3 
2 2 
3 4 
1 1 
3 2 
4 3 
3 7 
4 7 
1 6 
3 7 
7 4 
5 
6 
4 
6 
3 
17 8 
26 2 
27 8 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
2 2 
1 7 
3 7 
3 7 
7 
5 
7 
14 3 
15 6 
16 5 
19 5 
21 0 
22 1 
23 7 
24 8 
25 7 
47 2 
48 6 
5 4 
1 3 
3 5 
2 2 
2 2 
5 5 
3 5 
2 3 
3 3 
4 
2 3 
4 4 
3 3 
4 3 
2 3 
2 2 
4 5 
5 6 
3 3 
4 5 
• • 
4 3 
6 6 6 
5 7 6 
3 6 6 
2 7 7 
2 7 7 
3 7 7 
4 6 6 
111 
4 7 7 
5 
4 6 7 
31 2 
39 6 
41 4 
43 3 
49 5 
52 1 
6 4 
4 1 
2 1 
1 1 
1 1 
4 4 
5 6 
2 6 
4 1 
1 1 
2 2 
4 4 
6 7 
4 4 
1 7 
1 7 
1 7 
3 7 
5 
3 
5 
5 
5 
6 
32 2 2 
34 5 1 
2 12 
2 11 
2 6 7 4 
2 7 7 7 
co
cr
>
4
a.
cr
to
j 
187 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
B 2 
C 1 
2 
3 
36 3 
37 2 
42 0 
4 4 
1 1 
3 3 
4 5 
1 1 
3 4 
2 
1 
4 
6 
7 
5 
4 
5 
4 
30 4 
33 6 
35 0 
38 4 
40 5 
44 6 
45 2 
50 5 
51 0 
53 3 
7 7 
3 7 
5 7 
2 4 
1 1 
5 6 
6 7 
4 4 
4 1 
5 4 
7 7 
7 4 
7 7 
5 4 
1 1 
6 6 
7 7 
3 3 
4 4 
3 7 
7 7 6 
6 7 7 
7 
6 6 5 
16 5 
6 
7 
5 6 5 
111 
2 7 5 
65 7 
69 2 
70 2 
1 1 
1 2 
2 4 
3 1 
2 2 
4 4 
1 5 
5 7 
3 6 
6 
5 
5 
67 3 
68 2 
74 2 
5 6 
4 5 
2 2 
6 6 
6 5 
1 2 
4 7 7 
3 6 6 
5 6 4 
64 3 
66 1 
71 3 
72 4 
73 4 
4 5 
7 7 
4 4 
5 6 
1 6 
5 7 
7 7 
4 5 
6 6 
6 4 
6 
7 
4 
4 
3 
5 
7 
4 
5 
7 
6 
5 
5 
4 
7 
188 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
!5G?fT 
FIR?' LE\'EL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
D 
E 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
75 4 
78 2 
81 8 
85 5 
4 4 
1 3 
1 1 
4 4 
5 5 
3 3 
1 1 
4 4 
4 7 
2 6 
1 7 
4 7 
76 3 
79 9 
83 8 
86 8 
1 1 
2 2 
4 4 
2 4 
1 1 
4 4 
4 4 
3 4 
1 7 
6 6 
3 6 
5 6 
77 2 
80 1 
82 4 
84 0 
7 7 
5 6 
6 6 
3 3 
7 7 
6 0 
6 6 
3 4 
7 5 
7 7 
7 
4 6 
5 11 
6 2 4 
7 12 
9 7 2 
2 2 1 
4 4 4 
2 2 2 
2 2 3 
4 2 
11 2 
12 3 
5 7 
3 3 
5 4 
7 6 
3 3 
4 6 
5 5 
3 6 
3 5 
1 5 
2 4 
3 2 
8 4 
5 6 7 7 
3 4 4 3 
5 7 7 6 
4 5 5 4 
3 6 
5 7 
5 
5 5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
• 
6 
6 
7 
4 
7 
5 
6 
4 
7 7 
6 6 
• 
6 6 
a
>
(j
ia
>
c
rt
 
(j
ia
ic
ri
o
*
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DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
10 
13 
3 
2 
3 
4 
2 
4 
7 
4 
7 
5 
7 
5 
6 
6 
6 
6 
4 
5 
110 
113 
123 
124 
6 
6 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
1 
2 
4 
3 
2 
1 
4 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
2 
7 
1 
111 
118 
122 
9 
6 
7 
2 
5 
4 
2 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
6 
5 
6 
4 
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
5 
6 
6 
5 
5 
112 
114 
115 
116 
117 
119 
120 
121 
136 
7 
5 
3 
3 
6 
6 
4 
4 
1 
4 
5 
7 
4 
6 
5 
5 
4 
3 
7 
3 
2 
1 
2 
5 
6 
3 
3 
7 
3 
2 
• 
2 
5 
3 
3 
4 
7 
2 
3 
• 
4 
5 
4 
3 
4 
7 
4 
3 
• 
6 
5 
3 
2 
6 
6 
2 
6 
7 
5 
6 
6 
1 
6 
5 
3 
4 
7 
5 
3 
7 
4 
5 
6 
5 
5 
4 
1 
5 
3 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
4 
2 
3 
6 
6 
1 
1 
5 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
4 
3 
3 
2 
5 
1 
1 
4 
1 
5 
2 
1 
6 
3 
6 
7 
7 
5 
7 
6 
7 
1 
6 
7 
7 
4 
7 
6 
6 
6 
102 
190 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
G 2 
3 
103 3 5 7 7 7 
104 1 4 . 
105 4 3 ■ 4 4 5 
4 
4 
106 2 
107 2 
108 3 
109 7 
5 6 
6 6 
7 7 
1 6 
6 7 
6 6 
7 7 
4 6 
3 7 
4 
5 6 
4 7 
6 
• 
5 
6 
H 1 
88 3 
89 6 
90 2 
94 3 
2 2 
1 1 
2 2 
1 1 
2 2 
1 1 
3 4 
1 1 
2 7 
1 7 
6 7 
1 7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
2 
87 4 5 5 5 
95 3 4 4 4 
96 6 5 4 3 
6 5 5 5 
4 4 7 5 
3 5 5 6 
3 
91 4 
92 2 
93 1 
7 7 
4 4 
7 7 
7 7 
4 5 
7 7 
7 
5 
6 
5 3 
4 3 
I 1 
125 111 
126 211 
135 611 
1 1 
1 1 
1 1 
17 5 
16 4 
17 7 
2 
1 6 7 7 7 6 7 7 129 
^
c
r»
'>
3
 
*
"
^
£
0
 
191 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
I 2 
3 
132 2 
134 3 
5 6 7 7 7 
3 2 4 4 1 
7 7 
7 5 
1 
7 
127 7 
128 6 
130 5 
131 1 
133 2 
6 6 
6 6 
3 4 
5 5 
6 6 
5 5 
6 6 
5 5 
6 6 
6 6 
6 5 
6 
5 7 
6 7 
4 
5 5 
• • 
5 5 
5 1 
J 1 
264 3 
267 3 
270 9 
276 6 
277 2 
2 2 
5 5 
3 3 
3 3 
1 2 
2 1 
3 4 
3 5 
3 3 
2 2 
2 7 6 
3 11 
6 7 7 
6 6 4 
17 7 
2 
261 4 
266 1 
271 6 
273 2 
274 3 
2 2 
3 5 
3 5 
4 7 
3 3 
3 3 
5 5 
5 7 
5 7 
4 4 
2 7 
5 6 
7 7 
6 7 
5 7 
7 
4 
4 
6 
6 
260 3 3 4 4 
262 5 2 2 3 
263 4 4 5 6 
265 6 1 1 1 
268 5 2 2 2 
269 4 4 3 2 
272 1 6 4 4 
275 2 4 5 4 
278 4 5 2 4 
279 3 5 5 5 
6 5 6 6 
2 6 7 7 
5 6 5 5 
14 7 7 
3 4 5 4 
5 6 6 6 
5 6 7 5 
5 5 6 6 
6 5 7 5 
5 5 6 5 
192 
DATA SET: Statement 5 {S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
K 
280 
213 
217 
221 
259 
4 
3 
8 
3 
1 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
2 
4 
2 
1 
1 
5 
3 
3 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
4 
5 
5 
5 
212 
215 
220 
222 
8 
9 
7 
3 
2 
4 
2 
4 
2 
4 
1 
2 
3 
4 
1 
6 
3 
4 
1 
4 
5 
4 
1 
1 
7 
6 
7 
7 
211 
214 
216 
218 
219 
2 
6 
9 
4 
2 
2 
5 
1 
2 
7 
2 
7 
1 
6 
7 
3 
7 
3 
6 
6 
3 
7 
1 
6 
7 
4 
7 
4 
5 
4 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
137 
139 
145 
5 
2 
4 
1 
3 
4 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
5 
1 
4 
2 
1 
3 
3 
7 
6 
5 
138 
144 
3 
4 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
4 
6 
3 
7 
7 
7 
140 
141 
4 
2 
2 
7 
5 
7 
6 
7 
5 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
5 
6 
5 
193 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
M 
N 
142 
143 
146 
147 
3 
4 
5 
4 
2 
1 
1 
3 
3 
4 
1 
3 
2 
6 
2 
2 
2 
5 
2 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
7 
7 
7 
4 
7 
6 
7 
3 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
4 
3 
1 
4 
6 
1 
1 
1 
3 
3 
1 
1 
3 
3 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
3 
2 
1 
• 
3 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
3 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
5 
7 
203 8 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
3 
5 
8 
5 
7 
5 
4 
5 
2 
1 
3 
2 
5 
0 
2 
3 
1 
2 
6 
1 
7 
1 
1 
3 
6 
6 
5 
4 
1 
4 
2 
6 
2 
2 
1 
1 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
6 
7 
7 
7 
6 
224 
229 
9 
6 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
7 
7 
7 
7 
223 
226 
231 
235 
236 
239 
8 
7 
3 
4 
6 
2 
1 
1 
5 
4 
2 
3 
1 
4 
4 
3 
1 
3 
1 
6 
3 
2 
1 
5 
1 
4 
2 
5 
1 
5 
1 
2 
5 
5 
2 
3 
7 
6 
5 
7 
7 
7 
7 
5 
6 
7 
6 
6 
194 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 {S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
N 
0 
225 
227 
228 
230 
232 
233 
234 
240 
241 
3 
3 
• 
3 
6 
7 
6 
2 
8 
3 
1 
5 
6 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
4 
5 
5 
2 
1 
1 
7 
3 
2 
2 
4 
4 
2 
1 
1 
7 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
3 
1 
1 
7 
2 
1 
5 
3 
6 
2 
1 
2 
7 
4 
7 
7 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
208 
210 
258 
2 
5 
2 
3 
6 
6 
1 
2 
2 
5 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
7 
5 
2 
1 
1 
3 
2 
1 
5 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
3 
5 
2 
2 
1 
2 
3 
2 
3 
7 
6 
3 
1 
7 
5 
2 
6 
7 
2 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
2 
2 
4 
5 
2 
3 
2 
6 
2 
3 
6 
3 
2 
6 
2 
2 
7 
2 
3 
7 
2 
3 
7 
2 
5 
7 
2 
2 
7 
6 
7 
6 
5 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
1 
6 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
1 
4 
4 
5 
4 
6 
6 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
6 
2 
1 
2 
1 
1 
5 
2 
3 
1 
1 
4 
5 
5 
1 
2 
1 
4 
3 
6 
1 
2 
1 
1 
6 
6 
1 
7 
7 
5 
195 
DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
0 3 
205 2 
206 4 
207 3 
209 4 
245 3 
2 2 
3 2 
3 4 
4 4 
4 5 
2 5 
2 3 
4 4 
5 6 
3 5 
4 6 
6 6 
3 6 
5 7 
2 5 
6 
6 
5 
7 
4 
P 1 
184 7 1 2 5 5 
185 6 1 1 1 1 
7 7 
1 7 
5 
7 
186 5 1 1 4 
187 3 1 1 1 
188 4 2 2 3 
189 8 3 3 2 
190 4 1 1 1 
204 5 3 2 2 
2 4 7 7 
116 5 
3 3 6 6 
4 2 6 5 
13 7 7 
2 4 7 6 
191 4 2 3 3 
192 2 1 1 1 
193 2 2 1 2 
194 4 2 3 3 
195 1 5 7 7 
196 .433 
197 4 2 1 1 
198 5 4 4 4 
199 4 4 4 5 
200 6 6 2 1 
201 6 3 4 3 
202 1 1 1 1 
3 4 7 7 
3 3 7 7 
4 2.. 
3 2 7 6 
7 7 7 5 
4 3 6 7 
2 2 7 5 
4 3 3 5 
5 3 6 6 
2 3 7 6 
3 3 7 7 
117 6 
Q 
252 6 1 1 4 4 
255 6 2 4 6 2 
3 7 7 7 
17 6 7 
^
•
N
j^
j:
:k
c
n
a
)
'«
J
M
c
n
*
c
o
c
y
\ 
[!
0
0
>
d
o
o
jc
j-
*
o
 
c
O
'J
k
C
s
.a
ia
^
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DATA SET: Statement 5 (S.5) through 
Statement 13 (S.13) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.5 S.6 S.7 S.8 S.9 S.IO S.ll S.12 S.13 
Q 2 
247 3 
248 6 
249 7 
256 6 
1 2 
2 ■ 3 
1 2 
2 1 
2 2 
3 4 
2 2 
3 2 
2 7 
4 7 
1 6 
3 6 
7 
5 
6 
7 
3 
246 . 
250 4 
251 6 
253 6 
254 5 
257 6 
5 6 
4 3 
4 6 
2 2 
2 3 
2 4 
7 7 
3 4 
5 4 
2 3 
2 1 
4 4 
7 
5 
2 
2 
4 
5 
6 
6 
6 
7 
6 
5 
4 
4 
7 
6 
5 
5 a:
ic
rc
oc
r>
cr
>
cr
>
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
A 1 
2 
3 
B 1 
2 
1 
7 
6 
5 
4 
17 7 7 
26 7 7 
27 3 7 
7 6 7 7 
7 7 7 7 
7 7 7 7 
14 3 5 
15 7 7 
16 5 6 
19 7 7 
21 7 7 
22 7 7 
23 5 6 
24 1 1 
25 6 6 
47 
48 6 7 
5 6 6 6 
6 6 7 7 
6 5 7 4 
7 7 7 7 
7 7 7 7 
4.7. 
6 5 6 4 
2 4 14 
6 6 7 6 
• • • • 
6 6 7 6 
31 4 
39 6 
41 7 
43 6 
49 6 
52 7 
6 5 4 6 4 
4 4 4 6 5 
5 5 6 7 7 
7 5 6 7 7 
5 7 5 6 7 
5 5 6 7 6 
32 6 7 6 6 7 
34 6 7 7 7 7 
198 
DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
B 
C 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
36 6 7 6 
37 7 4 1 
42 5 5 5 
4 6 5 
15 1 
0 6 0 
30 4 
33 7 
35 
38 6 
40 7 
44 
45 
50 4 
51 7 
53 7 
6 6 4 
7 7 7 
• • • 
6 5 4 
6 6 0 
• • • 
5 6 4 
7 7 7 
6 6 4 
6 
7 
• 
7 
6 
• 
• 
6 
7 
5 
4 
7 
• 
4 
6 
4 
5 
4 
65 7 
69 4 
70 5 
7 7 
5 6 
5 4 
6 7 
4 7 
6 7 
5 
5 
6 
67 7 7 7 
68 4 5 6 
74 5 6 5 
5 7 5 
0 6 5 
4 4 7 
64 5 7 
66 5 7 
71 4 4 
72 4 4 
73 5 6 
5 6 6 7 
5 4 7 5 
4 5 6 6 
4 4 6 4 
6 4 7 5 
199 
DATA SET: Statement 14 {S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
D 1 
2 
3 
E 1 
2 
3 
75 5 
78 6 
81 6 
85 5 
5 5 5 6 6 
6 5 5 6 5 
5 6 5 7 4 
5 6 5 6 5 
76 7 7 6 
79 6 6 6 
83 6 6 5 
86 6 6 4 
4 7 7 
6 7 6 
5 6 5 
5 5 5 
77 3 2 0 
80 7 7 7 
82 . . . 
84 6 6 6 
4 5 4 
4 7 7 
• • • 
5 6 6 
5 6 6 
6 5 7 
7 6 4 
9 7 7 
6 4 7 5 
5 6 7 5 
5 5 5 5 
7 6 7 7 
4 3 4 3 4 
11 5 6 5 6 
12 6 5 4 5 
5 3 
7 7 
5 6 
1 6 
2 6 
3 
8 6 
7 6 6 6 5 
7 5 6 7 7 
• • • • • 
5 6 6 6 5 
200 
DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
E 3 
F 1 
10 7 7 7 
13 4 5 6 
6 7 7 
6 6 6 
110 6 
113 6 
123 7 
124 5 
7 6 
6 6 
7 7 
6 4 
6 7 
7 7 
7 7 
5 7 
6 
7 
7 
4 
2 
111 6 
118 6 
122 5 
6 6 
5 5 
6 6 
4 7 
5 7 
6 6 
6 
7 
4 
3 
112 1 1 
114 4 6 
115 6 7 
116 3 3 
117 5 6 
119 7 7 
120 4 4 
121 4 4 
136 4 6 
2 3 12 
6 5 6 5 
7 6 7 7 
3 4 2 3 
6 7 7 4 
7 4 7 4 
4 4 6 4 
6 5 7 5 
6.64 
G 1 
97 7 7 7 
98 2 5 2 
99 6 5 5 
100 677 
101 576 
7 
5 
5 
7 
6 
102 6 6 6 6 7 6 
2 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 {S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
G 2 
103 6 2 
104 . 7 
105 
2 4 3 3 
6 7 7 7 
3 
106 7 
107 
108 6 
109 7 
6 7 6 7 7 
• • • • • 
5 6 5 6 5 
6 6 6 7 7 
H 1 
88 7 
89 6 
90 6 
94 7 
7 7 
7 7 
7 7 
7 7 
7 7 
6 7 
6 7 
7 7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
2 
87 6 
95 6 
96 5 
6 6 
6 7 
5 5 
6 7 
6 7 
5 6 
6 
6 
5 
3 
91 5 
92 4 
93 
5 4 3 6 6 
4 4 4 6 4 
I 1 
125 4 
126 6 
135 6 
4 4 3 4 4 
6 5 4 5 4 
7 6 5 7 5 
2 
129 
202 
DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
I 2 
132 6 6 
134 7 7 
6 6 6 4 
7 7 7 7 
3 
127 665 
128 
130 344 
131 477 
133 
5 5 5 
• • • 
4 6 
4 7 7 
J 1 
264 5 
267 1 
270 7 
276 4 
277 6 
5 4 4 7 4 
2 2 2 1 3 
7 7 7 7 7 
4 5 4 5 4 
6 7 6 7 7 
2 
261 7 7 7 7 
266 4 4 4 4 
271 7776 
273 5676 
274 6 5 6 7 
7 
6 
6 
6 
7 
7 
4 
6 
6 
7 
3 
260 565 
262 7 7 7 
263 444 
265 7 7 7 
268 564 
269 465 
272 666 
275 455 
278 344 
279 656 
4 
6 
4 
7 
5 
4 
5 
6 
2 
6 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
J 3 
280 423 2 4 
K 1 
213 5 6 
217 5 7 
221 3 6 
259 6 7 
5 6 7 6 
5 5 7 5 
5 4 7 6 
4 5 7 7 
2 
212 4 6 
215 4 6 
220 7 7 
222 2 2 
5 3 7 
6 6 6 
7 6 7 
2 4 7 
6 
6 
• 
4 
3 
211 7 7 
214 7 7 
216 1 1 
218 6 7 
219 4 6 
6 5 7 7 
6 6 7 7 
3 4 5 6 
5 5 7 7 
5 15 1 
L 1 
137 7 
139 4 
145 6 
7 7 7 7 7 
6 5 6 6 3 
6 4 4 7 5 
2 
138 6 7 7 7 7 
144 6 7 6 6 7 
7 
7 
3 
140 6 7 6 6 7 
141 6 6 6 6 6 
6 
6 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
M 
142 
143 
146 
147 
7 
4 
6 
4 
7 
7 
7 
5 
7 
6 
7 
5 
7 
7 
7 
5 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
5 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
6 
7 
5 
• 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
6 
203 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
4 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
6 
7 
5 
6 
6 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
N 
224 
229 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
7 
223 
226 
231 
235 
236 
239 
7 
7 
5 
7 
5 
7 
7 
6 
5 
7 
4 
7 
7 
6 
4 
7 
6 
7 
6 
5 
5 
7 
6 
6 
7 
7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
N 3 
225 6 
227 6 
228 6 
230 7 
232 2 
233 7 
234 7 
240 
241 7 
6 6 6 6 6 
7 6 6 7 6 
6 6 6 6 4 
7 7 7 7 7 
5 5 4 6 5 
7 7 7 7 7 
7 7 6 7 7 
7 7 6 7 7 
6 6 5 7 5 
0 1 
167 6 7 
168 . 5 
169 4 2 
170 6 7 
171 7 4 
208 6 7 
210 6 7 
258 4 4 
6 6 7 6 
6 5 7 6 
3 4 4 5 
7 6 7 6 
4 6 7 6 
6 6 7 6 
7 7 7 7 
4 2 2 2 
2 
172 4 
173 2 
174 2 
175 6 
176 
177 1 
4 6 4 5 5 
4 4 5 2 2 
112 12 
7 6 6 7 7 
. • • • • 
2 13 5 6 
3 
178 2 2 6 5 
179 5 6 5 4 
180 1111 
181 67.6 
182 7 7 7 7 
183 5 4 5 4 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
O 3 
205 5 6 
206 3 7 
207 5 6 
209 6 7 
245 5 6 
6 6 7 6 
5 3 7 7 
5 4 7 6 
7 7 7 7 
4 4 6 5 
P 1 
184 6 7 5 6 7 
185 5 7 7 7 7 
5 
6 
2 
186 7 7 
187 7 7 
188 5 5 
189 5 4 
190 6 7 
204 5 6 
7 7 7 7 
6 4 7 5 
6 5 6 5 
5 5 2 4 
7 7 7 7 
6 6 6 6 
3 
191 777 
192 777 
193 
194 666 
195 7 7 4 
196 677 
197 666 
198 555 
199 665 
200 677 
201 677 
202 666 
6 7 7 
17 4 
• • • 
6 7 7 
4 7 7 
6 7 7 
6 6 5 
5 5 5 
5 7 7 
6 7 7 
7 7 7 
6 6 6 
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DATA SET: Statement 14 (S.14) through 
Statement 19 (S.19) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE S.14 S.15 S.16 S.17 S.18 S.19 
Q 2 
247 6 7 
248 4 4 
249 5 6 
256 5 6 
6 6 7 7 
5 5 7 6 
6 6 6 6 
7 5 5 5 
3 
246 5 
250 5 
251 6 
253 7 
254 6 
257 6 
4 4 
5 6 
7 6 
6 6 
5 4 
6 3 
2 7 
5 7 
6 7 
7 7 
4 6 
5 7 
6 
7 
7 
7 
6 
7 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
A 
B 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
18 4 
20 4 
28 3 
29 1 
46 3 
5 13 2 4 
2 2 12 4 
4 113 3 
5 14 2 2 
3 3 0 2 5 
17 6 
26 
27 6 
7 
4 
3 13 3 
4 3 2 1 
14 13 
14 6 
15 2 
16 1 
19 3 
21 7 
22 5 
23 2 
24 3 
25 6 
47 5 
48 6 
3 2 2 2 
5 1112 
6 12 3 4 
3 12 2 5 
7 1115 
5 2 2 2 2 
5 0 3 1 4 
6 4 111 
5 1112 
5 0 14 3 
4 12 3 3 
31 3 
39 4 
41 6 
43 4 
49 5 
52 3 
6 0 13 4 
4 2 12 2 
7 0 4 3 2 
6 13 3 1 
5 3 12 2 
3 3 2 1 2 
32 
34 7 
2 14 3 
4 13 2 
20.E 
0 
1 
2 
1 
0 
0 
0 
1 
1 
2 
0 
0 
2 
2 
2 
3 
5 
2 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
2 
0 
0 
0 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20.D 20.E 
B 
C 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
36 5 
37 1 
42 4 
6 1 
5 0 
6 3 
2 4 
2 2 
1 3 
3 0 
5 3 
1 2 
30 2 1 3 
33 1 3 3 
35 4 4 2 
38 3 5 2 
40 4 6 4 
44 4 4 2 
45 3 4 0 
50 3 5 0 
51 2 7 1 
53 4 4 2 
12 4 0 
113 2 
2 2 2 2 
19 2 2 
0 12 3 
12 0 4 
3 4 2 1 
3 2 3 2 
4 3 2 0 
2 2 2 2 
65 2 
69 5 
70 5 
1 0 
4 1 
4 2 
0 5 
4 2 
4 3 
5 0 
3 0 
0 0 
67 1 
68 5 
74 3 
1 4 
4 1 
6 3 
1 2 
2 5 
2 2 
3 0 
2 0 
2 1 
64 6 
66 7 
71 1 
72 3 
73 4 
3 2 
6 3 
0 0 
4 1 
4 1 
2 2 
2 3 
1 1 
2 4 
4 3 
1 1 
2 0 
6 2 
3 0 
2 0 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20.D 20.E 
D 
E 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
75 6 
78 6 
81 5 
85 4 
5 1 
5 6 
6 1 
4 2 
2 1 
0 2 
1 1 
2 2 
3 3 
2 0 
4 3 
2 2 
76 5 
79 4 
83 5 
86 3 
5 12 13 
4 2 2 2 2 
5 5 0 2 2 
4 0 3 2 5 
m
C
V
J
r
-
I
O
 
^
O
O
r
^
O
 
O
O
r
H
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
E 3 
F 1 
10 2 
13 4 
1.3 4 1 2 
5 3 0 2 2 
110 6 53 
113 653 
123 372 
124 573 
1 
4 
3 
4 
2 
111 5 
118 6 
122 6 
6 6 0 1 3 
7 3 0 5 1 
7 4 12 2 
3 
112 6 
114 5 
115 6 
116 5 
117 5 
119 5 
120 4 
121 4 
136 
5 3 2 2 2 
5 2 113 
5 3 12 2 
6 2 114 
5 3 0 2 4 
6 3 2 3 1 
4 12 13 
7 2 2 2 4 
2 2 2 2 
G 1 
97 6 
98 3 
99 2 
100 6 
101 5 
6 3 115 
4 6 0 0 3 
5 3 2 2 3 
6 7 0 0 2 
2 3 2 1 2 
102 5 6 3 2 2 3 
20.E 
0 
3 
1 
0 
2 
1 
0 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
0 
2 
0 
1 
0 
1 
2 
0 
2 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
G 2 
103 6 
104 1 
105 5 
7 0 2 5 3 
7 6 0 0 2 
6 2 3 3 2 
3 
106 3 
107 5 
108 5 
109 4 
4 3 2 2 3 
5 3 2 2 3 
5 3 12 3 
5 4 0 2 4 
H 1 
88 5 
89 2 
90 6 
94 7 
5 14 2 2 
6 3 12 2 
6 2 12 3 
6 12 4 2 
2 
87 2 
95 2 
96 6 
6 3 12 2 
6 2 3 3 2 
6 3 12 4 
3 
91 2 
92 3 
93 4 
6 3 12 2 
4 6 0 0 4 
5 12 3 2 
I 1 
125 7 
126 5 
135 3 
7 2 5 1 1 
6 4 3 1 1 
4 3 2 3 2 
129 5 5 2 110 
20.E 
0 
2 
O
C
S
IO
 
O
O
r
H
O
 
rH
C
N
IC
V
JrH
 
(
M
O
O
 
C
M
O
C
M
 
tH
»
H
O
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
I 2 
132 6 7 2 1 2 
134 3 5 2 3 3 
4 
2 
127 2 
128 2 
130 5 
131 4 
133 4 
5 0 112 
3 115 2 
5 2 3 3 2 
4 14 5 0 
5 2 3 2 3 
J 1 
264 5 
267 5 
270 7 
276 4 
277 7 
6 14 2 1 
7 0 2 3 5 
4 113 4 
6 13 2 2 
5 0 2 6 2 
2 
261 7 
266 5 
271 
273 7 
274 6 
6 12 2 2 
5 12 14 
2 2 2 2 
2 2 2 3 2 
7 5 112 
3 
260 7 
262 5 
263 5 
265 2 
268 5 
269 5 
272 1 
275 4 
278 5 
279 
5 113 2 
5 114 3 
5 12 2 3 
4 112 4 
5 3 0 2 1 
6 13 3 2 
6 0 0 4 
5 0 111 
5 12 0 6 
2 0 4 4 
20.E 
1 
0 
6 
1 
0 
0 
0 
2 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
3 
1 
2 
1 
4 
1 
0 
7 
1 
0 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
J 3 
280 2 6 112 2 
K 1 
213 4 
217 5 
221 1 
259 6 
5 3 2 1 1 
5 2 111 
4 2 4 3 1 
7 3 2 2 2 
2 
212 5 
215 4 
220 7 
222 4 
5 3 2 0 1 
4 0 4 0 6 
7 2 3 2 1 
5 13 3 3 
3 
211 5 
214 4 
216 4 
218 5 
219 5 
6 0 5 2 3 
7 3 12 2 
6 2 3 5 0 
6 2 2 2 2 
7 4 5 0 0 
L 1 
137 5 
139 4 
145 4 
5 112 2 
2 0 3 0 3 
5 12 3 2 
2 
138 3 
144 
2 3 3 
2 2 2 
3 
140 3 2 2 0 
141 6 7 6 2 
3 3 
1 0 
20.E 
3 
3 
5 
0 
1 
4 
0 
1 
0 
0 
2 
0 
2 
1 
4 
4 
2 
1 
3 
2 
1 
215 
DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20.D 20.E 
L 3 
142 2 
143 4 
146 1 
147 3 
3 0 0 4 6 
4 0 12 5 
1 2 6 0 0 
2 3 111 
M 1 
156 4 
157 5 
158 5 
159 4 
160 5 
6 3 3 0 2 
4 0 0 2 4 
6 0 13 4 
5 2 3 2 2 
4 0 13 1 
2 
203 2 6 0 13 3 
3 
161 4 
162 2 
163 4 
164 5 
165 4 
166 6 
6 15 2 2 
5 0 3 2 5 
4 0 15 2 
3 0 4 3 3 
6 13 13 
6 0 2 4 1 
N 1 
224 7 
229 6 
4 3 3 1 0 
7 6 112 
2 
223 1 
226 1 
231 6 
235 6 
236 5 
239 4 
12 13 4 
7 2 2 2 2 
6 3 113 
7 10 5 2 
7 5 3 0 1 
4 6 0 3 0 M
M
C
O
C
O
C
O
O
 
O
U
>
 
(
-
‘
C
O
O
C
O
O
O
 
U
) 
c
n
t-
*
c
o
»
u
c
o
 
O
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O
C
O
O
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
N 3 
225 6 
227 2 
228 6 
230 6 
232 4 
233 5 
234 4 
240 4 
241 7 
5 4 3 1 1 
6 2 13 3 
6 3 12 3 
7 3 112 
6 4 2 2 2 
7 5 0 2 2 
4 4 113 
7 6 2 0 2 
4 2 2 2 2 
O 1 
167 3 
168 3 
169 3 
170 5 
171 5 
208 1 
210 4 
258 2 
4 3 2 1 2 
4 10 5 2 
5 4 2 1 3 
5 4 0 3 3 
6 3 0 3 1 
5 1 1 2-3 
7 116 2 
4 0 2 3 5 
2 
172 4 
173 1 
174 3 
175 2 
176 4 
177 2 
7 0 14 2 
6 . • * * 
5 3 12 2 
4 0 4 3 2 
4 115 2 
2 13 0 4 
3 
178 3 
179 4 
180 5 
181 2 
182 6 
183 3 
6 0 3 3 0 
4 10 4 4 
4 2 2 1 2 
5 2 2 3 2 
5 3 0 4 3 
5 13 2 2 
20.E 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
1 
1 
0 
2 
2 
1 
0 
0 
3 
3 
0 
0 
3 
• 
2 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
3 
1 
0 
2 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20. 
0 3 
205 4 
206 5 
207 4 
209 4 
245 4 
2 4 0 2 2 
5 4 5 0 1 
4 12 4 3 
6 4 2 3 1 
5 3 2 1 4 
P 1 
184 6 
185 6 
7 2 2 2 2 
6 3 2 2 2 
2 
186 7 
187 7 
188 6 
189 5 
190 5 
204 6 
5 3 112 
5 4 113 
6 3 3 1 1 
6 5 2 1 1 
4 5 0 3 2 
5 3 113 
3 
191 7 5 
192 7 7 
193 7 5 
194 6 5 
195 7 7 
196 4 6 
197 6 4 
198 4 4 
199 
200 6 3 
201 5 6 
202 6 7 
4 2 2 1 
5 2 11 
5 12 1 
6 12 1 
4 111 
3 12 2 
3 3 11 
• • • • 
4 112 
3 3 11 
4 2 12 
3 3 12 
Q 1 
252 3 
255 7 
3 0 2 2 3 
7 0 3 3 4 
20.E 
2 
0 
0 
0 
0 
2 
1 
3 
0 
2 
1 
0 
2 
1 
1 
1 
0 
3 
1 
2 
• 
1 
1 
1 
1 
3 
0 
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DATA SET: Dynamism and Complexity, 
Statement 20 (S.20) 
MGMT dyna- com- 
FIRM LEVEL CASE mic plex 20.A 20.B 20.C 20.D 20.E 
Q 2 
247 6 
248 6 
249 5 
256 5 
7 0 0 5 3 
4 2 14 3 
7 2 0 1 5 
5 0 3 3 4 
3 
246 4 
250 2 
251 5 
253 3 
254 4 
257 5 
5 10 2 4 
5 113 4 
4 2 2 5 1 
4 0 0 2 5 
6 0 2 3 5 
4 0 2 3 5 O
O
O
J
O
h
-
*
!
*
)
 
O
C
O
O
C
O
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DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
18 
20 
28 
29 
46 
17 
26 
27 
14 
15 
16 
19 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
47 
48 
B 1 
31 
39 
41 
43 
49 
52 
32 
34 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
13 14 
2 4 15 
2 2 2 2 
13 4 3 
4 3 15 
4 2 15 
12 3 5 
15 2 4 
15 3 2 
2 4 3 1 
3 2 15 
2 3 15 
4 3 2 1 
3 4 2 5 
2 4 13 
5 4 3 2 
2 3 4 5 
3 12 4 
3 2 15 
3 12 4 
4 3 3 2 
3 2 14 
2 13 5 
5 4 3 2 
2 3 3 4 
2 3 2 4 
2 4 3 1 
SET 
.A 
3 
3 
3 
3 
2 
3 
1 
3 
4 
5 
4 
4 
5 
1 
5 
1 
1 
5 
4 
5 
3 
5 
4 
1 
4 
3 
5 
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DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
B 2 
36 
37 
42 
30 
33 
35 
38 
40 
44 
45 
50 
51 
53 
65 
69 
70 
67 
68 
74 
64 
66 
71 
72 
73 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
3 12 5 
4 3 12 
2 3 4 1 
4 3 15 
12 4 3 
2 2 2 2 
5 14 2 
5 13 4 
2 3 2 2 
2 13 4 
2 2 13 
12 3 5 
4 5 3 1 
4 12 3 
12 3 5 
12 4 5 
4 3 2 5 
2 13 5 
4 2 15 
3 15 4 
12 4 5 
4 2 13 
3 12 5 
12 3 5 
SET 
.A 
4 
5 
5 
2 
5 
2 
3 
2 
3 
5 
5 
4 
2 
5 
4 
3 
1 
4 
3 
2 
3 
5 
4 
4 
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DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
D 1 
75 
78 
81 
85 
2 
76 
79 
83 
86 
3 
77 
80 
82 
84 
E 1 
5 
6 
7 
9 
2 
4 
11 
12 
3 
1 
2 
3 
8 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
2 3 11 
5 3 2 4 
5 3 12 
5 5 3 4 
3 4 12 
2 4 3 1 
5 3 2 4 
2 3 15 
4 12 3 
3 2 2 3 
12 5 4 
15 2 4 
4 3 2 1 
3 4 15 
13 2 5 
3 2 14 
5 3 2 1 
13 2 5 
5 13 4 
3 2 15 
3 4 12 
3 2 14 
2 3 4 4 
SET 
.A 
2 
1 
4 
4 
5 
5 
1 
4 
5 
1 
3 
3 
5 
2 
4 
5 
4 
4 
2 
4 
5 
5 
3 
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DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
E 3 
10 
13 
F 1 
110 
113 
123 
124 
2 
111 
118 
122 
3 
112 
114 
115 
116 
117 
119 
120 
121 
136 
G 1 
97 
98 
99 
100 
101 
102 
; Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
4 12 5 
3 2 11 
3 2 4 5 
13 3 0 
5 2 13 
5 4 13 
4 4 11 
5 14 3 
2 2 2 3 
2 2 2 2 
5 4 2 1 
5 12 3 
3 4 4 2 
5 3 14 
3 2 4 5 
3 4 12 
2 3 15 
4 2 5 1 
4 3 15 
5 4 2 3 
4 3 2 5 
4 5 2 3 
4 3 2 1 
3 4 15 
SET 
.A 
3 
2 
1 
3 
4 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
3 
4 
3 
2 
1 
5 
4 
3 
2 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
223 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
G 2 
103 
104 
105 
3 
106 
107 
108 
109 
H 1 
88 
89 
90 
94 
2 
87 
95 
96 
3 
91 
92 
93 
I 1 
125 
126 
135 
129 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
3 12 5 
5 4 12 
2 14 5 
3 4 2 5 
2 2 2 3 
4 3 2 5 
4 3 2 5 
12 3 5 
5 4 3 2 
3 4 4 2 
3 12 5 
5 4 2 3 
12 3 5 
3 4 15 
5 3 4 2 
4 2 3 5 
4 3 4 4 
14 3 5 
2 4 3 5 
3 14 5 
12 3 3 
SET 
.A 
4 
3 
3 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
4 
1 
4 
2 
1 
1 
5 
2 
1 
2 
1 
2 
224 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
132 
134 
127 
128 
130 
131 
133 
264 
267 
270 
276 
277 
261 
266 
271 
273 
274 
260 
262 
263 
265 
268 
269 
272 
275 
278 
279 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
3 2 15 
2 13 5 
3 4 2 1 
3 12 4 
2 13 5 
115 5 
13 2 5 
12 3 4 
3 2 14 
3 2 15 
12 3 4 
2 13 4 
1111 
4 2 13 
2 112 
2 3 5 4 
4 3 2 5 
5 13 2 
3 5 4 2 
4 2 5 3 
3 2 15 
5 3 4 1 
12 4 5 
4 3 2 5 
4 4 5 1 
2 4 13 
4 2 13 
SET 
.A 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
4 
5 
5 
3 
5 
3 
1 
1 
4 
1 
1 
4 
2 
3 
1 
5 
4 
5 
225 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
J 3 
280 
K 1 
213 
217 
221 
259 
2 
212 
215 
220 
222 
3 
211 
214 
216 
218 
219 
L 1 
137 
139 
145 
2 
138 
144 
3 
140 
141 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
4 3 2 1 
3 5 4 2 
4 5 3 1 
12 4 5 
2 3 4 5 
3 5 4 1 
2 4 15 
12 3 5 
2 3 15 
13 2 5 
4 5 5 4 
2 14 5 
1111 
15 4 3 
5 2 3 1 
3 4 2 1 
5 12 3 
12 2 5 
2 3 4 1 
3 112 
2 2 3 1 
SET 
.A 
5 
1 
2 
3 
1 
2 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
3 
1 
2 
4 
5 
4 
5 
5 
3 
1 
226 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
142 
143 
146 
147 
M 1 
156 
157 
158 
159 
160 
203 
161 
162 
163 
164 
165 
166 
N 1 
224 
229 
223 
226 
231 
235 
236 
239 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
3 2 15 
2 3 4 5 
10 0 2 
12 11 
2 5 4 3 
4 3 12 
4 2 13 
4 2 13 
4 3 2 1 
4 12 1 
12 3 5 
3 2 15 
2 2 2 2 
12 3 4 
14 2 3 
2 3 14 
2 4 5 3 
4 3 2 5 
4 2 15 
3 12 4 
5 4 2 3 
5 12 3 
15 3 4 
13 2 4 
SET 
.A 
4 
1 
1 
1 
1 
5 
5 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
2 
5 
5 
5 
1 
1 
3 
5 
1 
4 
2 
5 
227 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
N 3 
225 
227 
228 
230 
232 
233 
234 
240 
241 
0 1 
167 
168 
169 
170 
171 
208 
210 
258 
172 
173 
174 
175 
176 
177 
178 
179 
180 
181 
182 
183 
: Statement 21 (S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
2 3 4 5 
4 2 15 
5 3 2 4 
2 13 4 
3 4 2 5 
5 2 3 4 
3 4 2 5 
3 4 2 3 
4 5 3 2 
5 14 3 
5 12 3 
3 4 2 5 
5 2 3 4 
5 3 4 2 
4 3 2 1 
3 12 5 
3 2 15 
4 13 2 
12 3 3 
5 3 2 4 
12 3 4 
5 2 3 1 
2 5 14 
2 15 3 
5 2 14 
3 2 3 5 
4 13 5 
5 3 4 5 
13 4 2 
SET 
.A 
1 
3 
1 
5 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
5 
4 
4 
5 
1 
1 
5 
4 
3 
4 
3 
4 
2 
3 
5 
228 
DATA SET: Statement 21 (S.21) 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21.A 21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
0 3 
205 1 
206 2 
207 4 
209 1 
245 2 
5 2 3 4 
15 3 4 
3 12 5 
3 2 4 5 
3 4 15 
P 1 
184 1 3 4 5 2 
185 1 3 4 2 5 
186 2 
187 1 
188 2 
189 1 
190 2 
204 1 
5 4 3 1 
4 3 2 5 
15 4 3 
2 5 4 3 
5 13 4 
4 5 2 3 
3 
191 1 2 
192 1 2 
193 1 5 
194 1 2 
195 1 5 
196 5 4 
197 1 4 
198 1 3 
199 1 5 
200 2 1 
201 1 3 
202 1 2 
5 
3 
4 
5 
2 
3 
3 
5 
4 
5 
5 
5 
Q 1 
252 5 4 3 1 2 
255 4 2 3 1 5 
229 
DATA 
MGMT 
FIRM LEVEL CASE 21 
Q 2 
247 
248 
249 
256 
246 
250 
251 
253 
254 
257 
: Statement 21 {S.21) 
21.B 21.C 21.D 21.E 
4 13 2 
5 12 4 
12 5 4 
13 2 5 
5 3 12 
3 2 15 
12 4 5 
4 3 12 
3 2 14 
3 2 14 
SET 
.A 
5 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
3 
5 
5 
5 
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